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THE COURTROOM AS CLASSROOM: INDEPENDENCE, 
IMAGINATION AND IDEOLOGY IN THE WORK OF 
JACK WEINSTEIN 
Stephen B. Burbank* 
This Article explores influences that have shaped Judge Weinstein's ju­
dicial behavior. The author argues that Weinstein's conception of the judi­
cial role has been influenced in significant respects by his career as a law 
professor. Tracing continuities and discontinuities between the roles of a 
professor and a trial judge, the author concludes that Judge Weinstein 
manifests both the desire for intellectual autonomy and the consequent lack of 
regard for institutional accountability that are characteristic of the former 
role. The Article then seeks to evaluate the judge-centered approach to judi­
cial independence it imputes to Judge Weinstein. The author contends that 
the desire to give free reign to his extraordinary intelligence and creativity 
plays a part in judge Weinstein's pursuit or creation of the extraordinary in 
preference to the ordinary- "litigations" rather than cases-an interpreta­
tion that helps to explain certain inconsistencies in his judicial work. The 
author also considers the possibility that ideology plays a part in judge 
Weinstein's approach to his role as a federal judge. He arg·ues that there are 
three interrelated ideas that exercise a consistent(v powerful influence on 
Weinstein's judicial behavior and that may be thought ideological: access, 
communication and empathy. He concludes that the dichotomy between in­
dependence and ideology in judge Weinstein's work may be false, because 
independence of a type-ethical individualism-is his overriding ideology. 
Although focusing on the work of judge Weinstein, the Article suggests some 
general conclusions about independence and accountability in a trial judge, 
about judicial imagination, and about ideology. 
INTRODUCTION 
Academics above all others should understand this need for in­
dependence and imagination [in j udges ] . vVhatever the curric­
ulum may say, we each run our classrooms to satisfy our individ­
ual visions. 
jack B. Weinstein1 
[L] ower federal courts .. . lack the freedom of law professors to 
overrule the [Supreme] Court. 
StejJhen B. Burbank2 
'' David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of 
Pennsylvania. John Goldberg, Robert Gorman, Howard Lesnick, Leo Levin, Louis Pollak 
and Stephen Subrin read and provided helpful comments on a draft. 
l. Jack B. vVeinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the 
Barriers to .Justice Being Raised�, 137 U .  Pa. L. Rev. 1 90 1 , 1 911 ( 1 989) [hereinafter 
V\'einstein, Barriers to justice]. 
2. Stephen B. Burbank, Afterwords: A Response to Professor Hazard and a Comment 
on Marrese, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 659, 660 ( 1 985) .  
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Thirty years i s  very nearly a career for many working p eople, or at 
least it was before age-discrimination legislation gave ordinary working 
people a taste of the security that the Constitution gives to Article III  
j udges.3 It is thus a humbling thought that Jack Weinstein had distin­
guished careers as a teacher, scholar and law reformer before he took 
office ( although, famously, neiLher ascended the bench nor donned the 
robe4) ,  let alone that he also served as a soldier. Indeed, the use of the 
past tense in connection with any of Jack Weinstein's careers is questiona­
ble.  Although a federal j udge for the past thirty years, he has continued 
to teach, to write-has any trial j udge in our history produced as many 
articles and books?-and to advocate and participate in the h ard work of 
law reform. 
The books and articles that Jack Weinstein has written,  together with 
his opinions, provide what some might call a "paper trail. " If only be­
cause that expression may be thought to imply a destination , I prefer to 
see Weinstein 's  extraj udicial writings as windows into his mind, helping 
us better understand his j udicial behavior, only fragments of which are 
preserved in published opinions . 5 
In a brief comment on one of Judge Weinstein's articles celebrating 
the fiftieth anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ,6 I noted 
that " [ o] ne hears much these days about the independence of the federal 
j udiciary . . .  [but] less about the independence of individual federal 
j udges, " and I voiced a suspicion that 'Judge Weinste in 's  years in 
3.  See LT.S. Const. an. III ,  § 1 ;  Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1 967, 29 
U .S.C. §§ 621-634 ( 1 994) . 
4. See Jack B. Weinstein, I ndividual Justice in Mass Tort Litigation 9 1  ( 1 995) 
[hereinafter Weinstein , Mass Tort L itigation] (preference to conduct "most nonjury work 
without a robe sitting in the courtroom at a table" ) .  In this respect Judge Weinstein has 
followed the advice of Jerome Frank and the example of his predecessor on the district 
court bench, Julian Mack. See Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial 254-61 (chapter entitled 
"The Cult of the Robe")  ( 1949 ) .  But see Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law 1 21 ( 1995) 
("The republican simplicity of manners-the 'I 'm no better than the next guy' 
deportment-that most American judges affect is intended to be admired rather than to 
be taken seriously. Judges receive deference because they have power, and the power 
resides in their votes .") ; Linda S. Nlullenix, Mass Tort as Public Law Litigation :  Paradigm 
Misplaced, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 579, 59 1 ( 1 994) ("As for me, I preferjudges in  their robes, 
and on the bench .") . 
5. Most of judge Weinstein'sjudicial behavior is not captured in opinions. See Letter 
from Jack B. Weinstein to Stephen B .  Burbank (June 1 1 , 1 996) (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) ( "[M] ost of [my favorite procedural decisions] are oral. . . .  They are almost 
never transcribed unless an appeal is taken, which occurs only infrequently .") . Such is 
generally the case with trial judges. See, e .g . ,  Frank, supra note 4, at 222-24; Posner, supra 
note 4, at 1 1 2- 1 4. Moreover, because of both the rhetorical function of opinions and 
publication practices that are neither comprehensive nor scientific, published opinions 
may give a distorted picture of the legal landscape. See Frank, supra note 4, at 1 65- 85; 
Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of 
Rule 1 1 ,  1 37 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 925, 1 955-56 ( 1 989) 
6. See Jack B. Weinstein,  The Ghost of Process Past: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie, 54 Brook. L. Rev. 1 ( 1 988)  [hereinafter 
Weinstein, Fiftie th Anniversary] . 
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academe contributed more than deep learning to his career  as a judge ."7 
I also observed that his article "demonstrate [ d ]  both the powerful vision 
of justice that has marked his career as a j udge and the practical vision of 
poli tics that has marked his career as a scholar," but I questioned 
"whether the Judge has succeeded in reconciling those visions. "8 
This Festschrift provides a welcome opportunity to pursue further 
the suggestion that Jack Weinstein's notions of judicial i ndependence 
and of the judicial role have been shaped in part by, but are not always i n  
harmony with, his experience and knowledge as a n  academic.  The view I 
take through the windows opened by his wri tings is that an important 
part of Weinstein the j udge is Weinstein the law professor. I therefore 
consider his work as a whole with an eye to continuities and discontinui­
ties between the roles of professor and federal j udge . I am primarily in­
terested in the first of the two desiderata in a judge that Weinstein him­
self identified and associated with academic life-independenceY I then 
briefly take up the quality that he l inked with independence-imagina­
tion 10-and a third quality that m ay be at war with independence, if not 
with imagination-ideology. 
When seeking to draw inferences from the written record of the past, 
it is  important to take account of the passage of time,  the effec ts of both 
experience and role on substance, 11 and the rhetorical demands of a par­
ticular role. In  Jack Weinstein's case,  that is only to say that the record is 
as complex as the man,  which is reason enough to resist labels of the sort 
that recurrently debase public discourse about  the federal j udiciary. It is 
also reason enough not to draw too much from what is after all only a 
part, even if an important part, of a full and active life .  
Still, in seeking to  delineate some of  the influences that h ave contrib­
uted to Weinstein's judicial behavior, I hope also to suggest some general 
lessons about independence and accountability in a trial j udge, about ju­
dicial imagination, and about  ideology. These are complex and difficult 
matters. Attempting to come to grips with them is critically important at 
a time when judges both state and federal are attacked, and in some j uris­
dictions may lose their offices, because of the decisions they make .  
Mindful o f  Judge Weinstein 's  observation that "[p] roceduralists are 
often hot-blooded as well as long-winded," 1 2 I shall attempt  to be neither. 
7. Stephen B .  Burbank, The Chancellor's Boot, 54 Brook. L. Rev. 31, 31 ( 1988 ) .  
8. Id. a t  32. 
9. See �Weinstein, Barriers to justice, supra note 1, at 1 911. 
10. See id. 
ll. .Judge Weinstein has explained such effects as follows: 
A..s authori ty for this warning against attempts to use class actions in torts, the 
[1966 Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 23] cites an article I wrote as a 
law professor. A..s a judge I have been forced to ignore this indiscretion when 
faced with the practicalities of mass tort l itigation. In the earlier 1960s we did not 
fully understand the implications of mass tort demands on our legal system .  
Weinstein, Mass Tort Litigation ,  supra note 4 ,  a t  135. 
12. \\'einstein, Barriers to Justice, supra note 1 ,  at 1904. 
1 974 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97: 1971 
I shall also attempt to avoid the "absurd . . .  notion that, because one 
finds fault in some ideas of men of genius, he should disregard all the 
rest." 1� I recognize how difficult it is  to be a j udge today, particularly a 
federal judge with Jack Weinstein ' s  personality, life experiences,  and be­
lief structure . If I pause over certain aspects of his judicial behavior that I 
find problem atic, it is to honor our shared commitment to the pursuit of 
knowledge . None of us would want to be emulated in every facet  of our 
professional lives. All of us would be better off if more federal judges 
emulated more facets of Jack Weinstein ' s  professional life .  
I. INDEPENDENCE Al"'D AccouNTABILITY 
In a mass tort case, a judge's failure to appreciate the reach 
and importance of his or her decisions is  tantamount to abdica­
tion of responsibility. Much as the President steers the ship of 
state at the head of the executive branch, each federal trial 
j udge, with respect to each case that comes before him or her, 
stands watch over the judicial branch . The trial judge is  in  most 
cases the final arbiter. If the trial judge fails to respond to the 
needs of the public ,  the only recourse is to appellate j udges who 
are narrowly confined in matters of fact and who are usually in a 
less favorable position than the nisi prius j udge to understand 
the full scope of a litigation. A rigid and unresponsive j udiciary, 
blind to the needs of various communities and of society at 
large, is far more likely to cause an erosion of public confidence 
in legal institutions than a judiciary perceived as overly inter­
ested in resolving problems before it. 1 4 
No doubt i t  expands the ego of a judge to look upon him self as 
the guardian of the general future . But his more humble yet 
more important and immediate task is to decide individual, ac­
tual, present cases . . . .  Such j udicial legislation as inheres in 
formulating legal rules is inescapable . But  courts should be 
modest in their legislative efforts to control the future . . . .  The 
future can become as perniciously tyrannical as the past. 
Posterity-worship can be as bad as ancestor-worship. '" 
Jack Weinstein brought to the bench an attitude towards indepen­
dence that was shaped by his experience as an academic. Academic free­
dom and judicial independence are alike in some respects ,  including the 
fact that they exist to protect institutions. They also differ in critical re­
spects .  Whereas intellectual autonomy is central to the integrity of the 
academic enterprise, it can be inimical to the perceived legitimacy of the 
judiciary in a democracy. Jack Weinstein's writings-his opinions and 
particularly his books and articles-are a rich repository for the consider­
ation of issues that are at the crossroads of judicial independence and 
1 3. Frank, supra note 4, at viii . 
14. Weinstein ,  Mass Tort Litigation,  supra note 4, at 92. 
1 5 .  Frank, supra note 4, at 287-88 (quoting Aero Spark Plug Co. v. B.C. Corp., 1 30 
F.2d 290, 295-96 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank, J . ,  concurring) ( footnotes omitted)). 
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accountability. Study of those writings suggests to me that Judge 
Weinstein is  too much Professor Weinstein .  I find evidence in his j udicial 
and extramural work of insufficient attention to institutional ( as opposed 
to individual) independence and, as a corollary, to the idea of, or mecha­
nisms for ensuring, accountability. But those are my conclusions, and I 
reach them having enormous respect for Judge Weinstein 's  s truggle with 
the "insoluble dilemma" of preserving legitimacy, while seeking to honor 
the "dominant needs and aspirations" of the times. 1 6  
A. Academic Freedom and Judicial Independence 
Jack Weinstein forged his credentials and reputation as an academic 
in a world where professors er-Uoyed substantial freedom to teach and 
write what they chose, and where the tenure system provided structural 
protection for their intellectual independence . 17 By the 1 960s, in any 
American insti tution of higher learning worthy of the name, an attempt 
to dictate the content of teaching or writing would have been resisted 
fiercely and probably successfully. For in the absence of explicit contrac­
tual language, American courts were l ikely to order the parties' relations 
in accordance with the normative stance worked out when the state 
sought to control the academic enterprise: 
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American uni­
versities is almost self- evident. No one should underestimate 
the vital role in a democracy that is played by those who guide 
and train our youth .  To impose any strait j acket upon the intel­
lectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the 
future of our Nation.  No field of education is so thoroughly 
comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be 
made. Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where few, 
if any, principles are accepted as absolutes.  Scholarship cannot 
flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers 
and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to 
evaluate, to gain new m aturity and understanding; otherwise our 
civil ization will stagnate and die.  18 
16. Archibald Cox, The Independence of the Judiciary: History and Purposes, 21 U .  
Dayton L .  Rev. 566, 567  ( 1996) .  
I d. 
The court must preserve its legitimacy and the ideal of law by invoking a maj estic 
sense of continuity. At the same time, the law must coincide with the dominant 
needs and aspirations of iL� times. The dilemma is insoluble . . . .  The judge who 
persistently confuses law with his or h er personal values also invites attacks upon 
judicial independence. In  short, the risk to the independence of the courts is the 
politicization of the judiciary. I t  can be created on either side. 
17. See ,  e.g. , Ralph S. Brown & Jordan E.  Kurland, Academic Tenure and Academic 
Freedom, Law & Contemp. Probs. ,  Summer 1990, at 325, 328-3 1 ,  333-34 (examining the 
impact of tenure on academic freedom) .  
18. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957 ) ;  cf. id. at 261-63 
( Frankfurter, ]. ,  concurring) (contending that government must not intrude on academic 
freedom without "exigent and obviously compelling" reasons) . 
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There have been strains on the tenure system in recent  years, the 
most troublesome of which have involved speech codes and attacks in the 
name of productivity. 1 9 In each case,  a rallying cry for change has been 
the need for accountability. 
Tenured American professors are not only independent, but also 
largely unaccountable.  It i s  true that professors must publish in order to 
qualify for tenure , and they may be responsive to peer pressure . Yet, 
once they have tenure, they may safely prefer the reflected glow of insti tu­
tional glory to the court of scholarly opinion.�0 Or at least they m ay do so 
if their salary, space and other similar perquisites are not dependent on 
the abil ity to secure grants .  That is to say, the tenure system is generally 
thought to confer on professors much the same protection against dimi­
nution of compensation that Article III confers on federal j u dges. �1 
Among academics, law professors have long been, and they remain, 
singularly insulated from accountability.22 Once law professors have ten­
ure,�3 if they run out  of ideas or for other reasons choose n o t  to publish, 
19. See, e.g. ,  M atthew W. Fin kin,  Introduction to The Case For Tenure 1, 1-2 
(Matthew W. Finkin ed., 1996) (defending tenure against such attacks) ;  Cass R. Sunstein,  
Academic Freedom and Law: Liberalism, Speech Codes, and Related Problems, in The 
Future of Academic Freedom 93,  106-12 (Louis Menand ed., 1996) (evaluating  university­
imposed content-based restrictions on speech) . 
20. But see William Van Alstyne,  Tenure: A Summary, Explanation and "Defense'', in 
The Case For Tenure, supra note 19 at 3, 3-4 (contending that universities may determine 
and apply standards of "adequate cause" so long as they do not abridge academic freedom 
or personal civil liberties) .  
Unlike federal judges, professors need not worry that their unpublished projects will 
appear on a list after three years. The Civil Justice Reform Act of l 990 ( CJRA) requires the 
preparation of a semiannual report, available to the public, "that discloses for each judicial 
officer . . the number and names of cases that have not been terminated within three 
years after filing." See 28 U.S .C. § 476(a) (1994 & Supp.  I 1995) .  In i ts evaluation of 
experience under the CJRA, RAl'JD 's Institute for Civil Justice found that after the 
requirement went  into effect, and al though " the  number of all civil cases pending . . .  
increased, . . .  the number of cases pending over three years . . .  dropped by about 25 
percent from its pre-CJRA level . "  James S. Kakalik, et a!. , An Evaluation of Judicial Case 
Management Under the Civil Justice Reform Act xxx ( 1996) . 
21. See American Ass' n  of U niv. Professors, 1940 Statement Of Principles On 
Academic Freedom and Tenure, reprinted in  Law & Contemp .  Probs. , Summer 1990, at 
407, 407 ("a sufficien t  degree of economic security to make the profession attractive to 
men and women of ability") ;  Letter from Robert A. Gorman, Professor, University of 
Pennsylvania Law School, to Stephen B. Burbank (March 6, 1 997) (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (contending that " [ t] enure would be an inadequate protection for 
independent and controversial speech by academicians if salary could be whi ttled away as a 
reprisal " ) . 
22. Cf. Posner, supra note 4, at 112 ("It is the unique insulation of federal appellate 
judges from accountability that makes their behavior such a challenge to the economic 
analysis of law, and more broadly to the universalist claims of the economic theory of 
human behavior. " (footnote omitted) ). 
23. I n  the old days it did not take much writing (or perhaps any) to secure tenure. 
Now, more is expected in that regard, but the absence of a community of scholars with 
shared interests (or values) -of a discipline of academic law-renders suspect both 
premises of "peer review." For a discussion of the importance of disciplines and 
J 
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the cost of salary increases foregone can be more than covered by con­
sulting fees. And if they do choose to publish, whether or not they have 
run out of ideas, peer review will not usually get in their way. 
If Judge Weinstein were stil l  only a professor, it might be that, as a 
doctrinalist, he would be forced to confront "the epistemic shallowness of 
the enterprise . "24 But he has never been only a doctrinalist.25 More im­
portant, no law professor, or at least none who is really interested in law, 
need be "only a professor. " As there are numerous opportunities to sup­
plement academic compensation,  so are there opportunities to build rep­
utation and popularity among groups far more numerous and powerful 
than the professoriate . 26 The classroom remains a good place to start .27  
It may be harder to remove a federal j udge from office for miscon­
duct than to fire a tenured universi ty professor,28 but that is a small  point 
at which to stick. Notwithstanding storm clouds on the academic hori­
zon, it is difficult to conclude that j udges enjoy greater independence 
than professors. This is as it should be, because there are important dif-
"disciplinarity" to academic freedom, see Louis Menand, The Limits of Academic  
Freedom, i n  The Future of  Academic Freedom, supra note 19 ,  a t  3 ,  3-20. 
24. Posner, supra note 4, at 88. 
25. See, e.g., Vargas v. Keane, 86 F .3d 1 273, 1 28 1  (2d Cir.  1 996) (Weinstein ,  J . ,  
concurring) (discussing results of  questionnaire he distributed to  jurors, which suggested 
that 'jurors are not as sensitive to the nuances of various charges on reasonable doubt as 
judges and lawyers seem to be") ; Jack B. Weinstein ,  Routine Bifurcation of Jury Negligence 
Trials: An Example of the Questionable Use of Rule Making Power, 14 Van d. L. Rev. 83 L 
847-52 ( 1 9 6 1 )  [hereinafter Weinstein ,  Routine Bifurcation ] ; infra text accompanying 
notes 1 28-1 30. 
Our academics and ethicists seem to prefer library research to field research .  
This preference is  understandable since field work is so time consuming and 
expensive, but  lack of i t  may lead to academic commentary having little relation 
to the real world. Should law professors have ethical obligations to resist 
becoming insulated and detached from the day-to-day realities of litigation and 
to produce work that can be better uti l ized by the public and the courts? 
Weinstein ,  Mass Tort Litigation, supra note 4, at 274 n .34.  
In  the view of one scholar/critic, Judge Weinstein has not been immune to academic 
fads. See Mullenix, supra note 4, at 583, 585 & n . 1 8. 
26. In contrast, the opportunities for federal judges to supplement their i ncomes and 
to engage in extramural activities that could serve as alternative sources of reputation are 
seriously constrained. See Posner, supra note 4, at 1 37-38; Stephen B. Burbank, Is it Time 
for a National Commission on Judicial Independence and Accountabilitv?, 73 Judicature 
1 76, 1 77 ( 1 990) . 
27 .  Law schools serve a profession. Some students become leaders of the bar, others 
judges, and still others politicians. As a result, not many insti tu tions can afford to tolerate 
the neglect of teaching and of students that is sometimes, perhaps unfairly, associated with 
the liberal arts tradition and that some see as unfortunate baggage of law's 
interdisciplinary voyage. 
28. See Posner, supra note 4, at 1 1 1  (suggesting that "pretty much the only thing that 
will get [an Article I I I  judge] removed is criminal activity. " ) . There is reason to doubt, 
however, whether in these days the "high hurdle" to removal of an Article I I I  judge that 
Judge Posner refers to-which must be that of transaction costs-would protect judges 
engaging in  some of the behavior he enumerates. See id. (mistreating staff; leaking 
confidential information to the press) . 
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ferences in the functions of independence and accountability in the two 
worlds. H owever, the relationship between individual freedom and inde­
pendence seems not to be such a difference . Both the individual j udge 
and the individual professor are protected so that an institution may 
flourish . 
Academic freedom is linked to the birth of the modern university in 
nineteenth-century Germany.29 In this country, the notion was promoted 
to advance "not the absolute freedom of utterance of the individual 
scholar, but the absolute freedom of thought, of inquiry, of discussion 
and of teaching, of the academic profession. "30 
Federal j udicial independence is also first and foremost an insti tu­
tional value, designed to protect the separation of powers and the rule of 
law.3 1 Article III of the Consti tution vests judicial power in courts ,  not 
judges.32 Remembering that lower federal court judges owe the exist­
ence of their positions to congressional rather than constitutional choices 
should help focus attention on the institutional goals that service during 
good behavior and the guarantee of undiminished compensation were 
meant to further.:�3 
29. See Walter P. Metzger, The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic  Freedom 
and Tenure, Law & Contemp. Probs . ,  Summer 1990, at 3, 1 4 -15. 
30. American Ass 'n  of Univ. Professors, General Report of the Committee on 
Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure, 1 Am. Ass'n U. Professors Bull .  17, 39 ( 19 1 5 ) ,  
reprinted i n  Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 1990, a t  393, 404-05 [hereinafter 1915 
AAUP Report); see also Thomas L. Haskell, Justifying the Rights of Academi c  Freedom in 
the Era of"Power/Knowledge," in  The Future of Academic  Freedom ,  supra note 19,  at 43,  
54 ("[The founders of the modern university] wanted to liberate individual practitioners 
. from the dictates of their employers, not as an end in  i tself, but as a way of enhancing 
the authority of the entire community of practitioners."  (footnote omitted) ) .  
31. See Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial Independence i n  the United States, 40 St. Louis 
U. LJ. 989, 989 ( 1996) ( identifying five component.<; that together "combine to assure an 
independent judiciary that is the basis for a society in which people and the government 
behave according to rules of law, rather than according to the will or whim of powerful 
rulers. " ) ;  Stephen B. Burbank, The Past and Present of Judicial I ndependence, 80 
Judicature 1 17, 1 18 (1996) . 
32. See U.S.  Const. art. Ill, § 1; Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the 
Functional Approach,  35 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 843 ( 1935) ( 'judges are human, but they are 
a peculiar breed of humans, selected to a type and held to service under a potent system of 
government controls. Their acts are 'judicial '  only within a system which provides for 
appeals, rehearings, impeachments, and legislation.") ;  Charles G. Geyh, Paradise Lost, 
Paradigm Found: Redefining the Judiciary's I mperiled Role in Congress, 71 N .Y. U. L. Rev. 
1 165, 1193 ( 1 996 ) .  
33. I t  may b e  useful for certain purposes to distinguish between the institutional 
independence of the judiciary and the i ndependence of an individual j udge, as 
when federal judges impose discipl ine on a colleague. Yet, even when there is 
conflict wi thin the j udiciary that implicates judicial independence, the ultimate 
values to be served are those that preserve and protect the judicial branc h  as an 
institution. I n  other words, the protection of the institution may on occasion 
require vindicating the position of an individual j udge who is in  conflict with the 
institution's leadership for the time being. 
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Academic freedom and accountability are in tension only to the ex­
tent that the latter threatens the "right to examine, question,  modify or 
rej ect traditional ideas and beliefs ."34 Although an assistant professor ex­
periences the "double-edged way" in which academic freedom operates ,35 
a tenured professor should be intellectually autonomous% and in that 
sense unaccountable .'�' 
Judicial independence and accountability may also be in tension, but 
not for the same reasons. Independence requires that judges be able to 
decide cases, find facts and say what the law is, free of both public pres­
sure and private blandishment. Yet, acknowledging the need for law, in­
cluding the law made by j udges , to evolve with the society it serves, it is 
not the role of judges of inferior federal courts freely to "modify or  reject 
[ those] traditional ideas and beliefs"38 that are captured in rules we call 
Burbank,  supra note 3 1 ,  at 1 1 7; see also Report of the Nat'l Comm'n on Judicial Discipline 
and Removal 9-1 7 ( 1 993) [hereinafter National Commission Report] (discussing 
consti tutional issues affecting federal judicial independence and accountabil ity) . 
34. S\veezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 262 ( 1 957) (Frankfurter, J . ,  concur ring) 
( quoting Conference of Representatives of the Univ. of Cape Town and the Univ. of the 
Witwatersrand, The Open Universities in South Africa I 0 ( 1 957) ) ;  see also id. at 262-63 
(" Dogma and hypothesis are incompatible, and the concept of an immutable doctrine  is 
repugnant to the spirit of a university.") . On the tension that may arise between individual 
and insti tutional academic freedom, see David M. Rabban,  A Functional Analysis of 
" Individual" and "Institutional" Academic Freedom under the First Amendment, Law & 
Contemp. Probs . ,  Summer 1990,  at 227, 280-300. 
35. Menand, supra note 23, at 9 (" [N] o one who is an assistan t professor coming up 
for tenure is likely to feel a strong association between the experience and the concept of 
in tellectual freedom." ) .  
36. Academic freedom does not, however, give any professor the right to be 
institutionally autonomous, as by refusing to teach courses reasonably assigned, to sef\·e on 
facul ty committees, and the l ike .  Such behavior is  not grounds for removal of tenure 
unless egregious, to be sure, but there are other instruments of accountability,  such as 
denial of a salary increase. The problem in contemporary law schools is that such 
measures may not be effective. 
37. This is not to deny " the immensity of the intellectual debt each of us owes to the 
disciplinary matrix within which we work." Haskell , supra note 30, at 76. Nor is i t  to deny 
that the parents of academic freedom in this country-those who wrote the 1 915 AAUP 
Report, supra note 30-"associated the right of academic freedom with a duty on the part 
of the academic profession to police its ranks and rigorously uphold standards." Haskell, 
supra note 30, at 57; see also id .  at 60 (discussing necessity of peer review, conducted by 
professors rather than trustees or administrators ) .  Nor still is i t  to deny that such remains a 
worthwhile goal today. See id. at 67 (" [T] he community of the competent cannot do iL'; 
work of cultivating and authorizing sound opinion unless its members confront one 
another and engage in mutual criticism.'') . It is, however, to assert that policing is more 
difficult in a world of fragmenting and disintegrating academic disciplines, and that it is 
precisely in such a world that tenured professors are most l ikely to insist upon their 
autonomy. 
38. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 262 (Frankfurter, .J., concurring) (quoting Conference of 
Representatives of  the University of Cape Town and the University of the 'Witwatersrand, 
The Open Universities in South Africa 10 ( 1 957) ) .  
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law. Stare decisis may not enshrine "immutable doctrine,"39 but neither 
may a federal trial judge be intellectual ly autonomous. 
The stakes are different as well. As a result, although academic free­
dom only sporadically raises accountability issues,40 accountability is now 
and always will be central to the independence of the j udiciary.4 1  Contin­
uing public acceptance of a life tenured j udiciary-its legitimacy in a de­
mocracy-depends upon continuing fai th in the means by which j udges 
are held accountable for their decisions. 
B.  judicial Accountability 
We should not forget that Justice Samuel Chase only narrowly es­
caped removal from office for partisan j udicial behavior in 1 805 or that, if 
the Senate had convicted him, the impeachment process might  have be­
come an acceptable instrument of policing unpopular judicial deci­
sions.42 That i t  is not so regarded is  rightly a cause of satisfaction . 43 But 
it is no more an occasion for complacency than is the unacceptability of 
court-packing plans after President Franklin Roosevel t's failed effort in 
1937, which, as I have noted elsewhere, "shar [es] with the trial ofJustice 
Chase status as a defining moment in the history of federal j udicial inde­
pendence. "44 To the contrary, having resolved to forswear blunt instru­
ments to hold our judges accountable for their decisions, we have a 
greater interest in ensuring the adequacy of the tools that remain. 
As suggested above, the rule of law is a potentially powerful norm of 
accountability that, when applied to the lawmaking of j udges, requires 
fidelity to the past. In that aspect the rule of law ideal refl ects the view 
that, in order to have a government of laws and not men,  the j udiciary 
must either follow or explain departures from precedent, "applying a 
39. ld. 
40. I happen to believe that academic  freedom is important to the wellbeing of 
American society, but not even rank self-in terest could cause me to equate i ts importance 
with the preset\'ation of federal judicial independence. Speech codes are a transient 
phenomenon; the quest for greater productivity may last longer, but, except as part of an 
attack on the tenure system. it poses only an indirect threat to academic freedom. 
41. A� the National Commission [ on Judicial Discipline and Removal] 
recognized, these concepts need not and should not be at war with one another. 
The Constitution provides for both as part of the system of checks and balances. 
It should be impossible, except perhaps for a lawyer, to think about one without 
thi nking about the other. Both tend  to ensure the respect and confidence 
necessary to the effectiveness of the federal judiciary in our representative 
democracy. Neither alone would do so. 
Burbank,  supra note 31, at 1 1 8; see also National Commission Report, supra note 33, at 
1-26.  
42. See Breyer, supra note 3 1 ,  at 990. 
43. See Burbank, supra note 3 1 ,  at 1 1 8 .  But see infra text accompanying note 229. 
44. Burban k, supra note 31, at 120. 
1997] INDEPENDENCE, IlviAGINATION AND IDEOLOGY 1981 
continuity of inherited legal principles ,  even though it strives to cater to 
the dominant needs of its times. "45 
Whatever comfort one may take from the shared backgrounds , edu­
cational and professional experiences, and socialization of federal 
j udges,46 the rule of law is not self-enforcing. Moreover, it is not a norm 
that obviously fosters accountability in much of the work of those courts 
that "are the heart of court-house government,"47 the trial courts. Finally, 
trial courts lack the safety of numbers-they lack both the greater capac­
ity of a plural court to ensure conformity and also the availability of the 
dissenting opinion to express nonconformity.48 
The common law tradition of public access to court proceedings is 
another means by which courts are m ade accountable and the legi timacy 
of the judiciary is preserved. The protection it affords is perhaps most 
important at the trial court level, where first instance decisions are made, 
many of which are effectively the final-although often not published­
word.49 In the Age of Settlement, when compromises extend to tradi­
tional litigation values, public access m ay be thought expendable.50 
Thus, at the end of the day, the most important warrant of accounta­
bility for the decisions of most federal judges-other than their own pro­
fessional self-discipline-is the realistic prospect of appellate review. s 1 
That is not good news. In 1949, Jerome Frank derided " the illusory no­
tion that upper courts can offset all the failings of the trial j uclges,"''2 and 
thus he disputed a major premise behind Felix Cohen 's  notion that 
45. Cox, supra note 1 6, at 580. For an in teresting recent unpacking of the various 
meanings of "The Rule of Law," see generally Richard H. Fallon,  Jr . ,  "The Rule of Law" as a 
Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1 ( 1 997) . 
46. But cf. National Commission Report, supra note 33, at 2 (" [A] ccepted standards 
of judicial conduct became contestable as a result of changing societal expectations and of 
the i ncreasing heterogeneity of the federal judiciary.") ; Weinstein, Mass Ton Li tigation , 
supra note 4, at 1 5 6, 1 62 ( acknowledging costs, including instability and unpredictability, 
of reliance on equitable discretion of trial courts ) . Compare Weinstein ,  Barriers to Justice, 
supra note l, at 1 902 ("enormous peer pressure and common background" have 
prevented discretion from breeding "unacceptable differences in practice among federal 
district courts andjudges") with Burbank, supra n ote 5, at 1 929-30 n . 23 (disputing judge 
Weinstein ' s  attempts to minimize disuniformity) . 
47. Frank, supra note 4, at 222; see infra text accompanying notes 83-86. 
48. D iversity does not have the same centrifugal force when fidelity to precedent is in 
question as it does when standards of conduct are concerned. Cf. supra note 46 (diversity 
of judiciary calls in to question previously accepted norms of judicial conduct) . The rule of 
law is safer in  a plural court than in  the hands of an individual judge. 
49. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
50. See Ci ncinnati Gas & Elec . Co. v. General Elec. Co. ,  1 1 7  F.R.D .  597, 600-02 (S .D .  
Ohio 1 987) , affd ,  854 F.2d 900, 905 (6th Cir .  1 988) (barring access to  summary jury trial 
on the ground that it is a settlement device) . 
5 1 .  See National Commission Report, supra note 33,  at l-2. 
52.  Frank, supra note 4, at 223;  see also id. at 33, 57. 
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judges serve "under a potent system o f  governmental controls . "53 Almost 
fifty years later, the prospect of appellate review is rarely realistic ,  and 
there is reason for concern about the quality of review when it occurs .54 
Through a combination of m oves-some small ,  some big, some whose 
consequences were intended,55 some unintended56-we have created a 
situation in which trial courts wield tremendous power and only with dif­
ficulty can be held accountable for their decisions. We m ay have put fed­
eral judicial independence at risk by depriving ourselves of the main 
structural check against abuse of power at the trial level. 
C. Independence and Accountability in the Work of Jack Weinstein 
As a judge, Jack Weinstein has been "true to an inner core of respon­
sibility" and thus has been willing "sometimes [to] risk, or even court, 
reversal to m ake certain that the appellate courts , the bar, academia and 
the public are fully aware that there is a strong opposing m oral view. "57 
From the unanswerable opinion Judge Weinstein wrote ( on remand) 
demonstrating why Rule 1 1  sanctions ordered by the Court of Appeals 
were inappropriate ,58 to his opinions protesting the dehumanizing ef-
53. Cohen, supra note 32, at 843; see also Frank, supra note 4, at 1 48-55 ( discussing 
social, economic, political and professional in fluences on trial judges, especially as 
compared with appellate judges) . 
54. See generally Will iam M. Richman & vVilliam L. Reynolds, El i tism, Expediency, 
and the New Certiorari :  Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition ,  8 1  Cornell L. Rev. 273 
( 1 996) (arguing that effective right to appeal error no longer exists and that the quality of 
the work of the courts of appeals has deteriorated) .  
55.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 ( a) p rovides i n  pertinent part that " [f] indings 
of fact, whether based on oral or documentary e\�dence, shall not  be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportuni ty of the trial court to 
judge of the credibility of the witnesses." Feel. R. Civ. P. 52(a) . A 1 985 amendmen t added 
the words, "whether based on oral or documen tary evidence," thereby i nsulating from 
reversal all findings of fact not clearly erroneous. See 471  U.S. 1 1 55 ,  1 1 58 ( 1 985) . 
56. See Stephen C. Yeazell ,  The Misunderstood Consequences of M odern Civil 
Process, 1994 'v\'is. L. Rev. 63 1 ,  646-48. "Today the two tiers have become uncoupled. Trial 
courts work with ever-more-elaborate procedural tools, but appellate courts have not  
correspondingly increased their supervisory powers. The result is greater independence 
for trial courts . "  I d.  at 641 ;  see also infra text accompanying notes 83-86. 
57. Jack B. Weinstein ,  Remarks in Symposium, Nazis in the Courtroom :  Lessons from 
the Conduct of Lavryers and Judges Under the Laws of the Third Reich and Vichy, France, 
61 Brook. L. Rev. 1 1 2 1 , 1 1 56 ( 1 995)  [ hereinafter Weinstein ,  Nazis] . 
58. See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp .  558 (E .D .N .Y. 1 986) 
(demonstrating errors in  the Court of Appeals' i n terpretation of Rule 1 1 , both as to the 
standard for imposing sanctions and also as to the allocation of responsibil ity between trial 
and appellate court for selecting a sanction ) .  llnfortunately, the Court of Appeals insisted 
on answering, h owever fecklessly, increasing the $ 1 ,000 sanction that judge Weinstein had 
imposed on the client to a $1 0,000 sanction on the client and attorney.  See Eastway 
Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 1 2 1  (2d Cir. 1 987) . I t  was consideration of th is 
case that prompted my ini tial thought-; about the influence of academia  on Judge 
Weinstein. See supra text accompanying note 7 .  
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fects of sentencing guidelines, 59 he has used his powerful mind and seem­
ingly inexhaustible energy to advocate his interpretations of existing laws 
and, where reinterpretation was not possible,  to advocate for change. 
Surely, this is the type of federal j udge we should want, whatever our 
political views. Dilemmas have two horns, and the rule of law ideal can­
not require us always to stick on one of them .60 To that extent we should 
agree with Judge Weinstein that " [r ]  isk-for-risk, . . .  a thinking, informed 
j udge is far less dangerous than one pickled in his own, ever-so-ethical 
views." 61 And that is a very considerable extent, because it concedes to a 
federal trial judge the freedom ( if not assigning the responsibility) to 
question and criticize laws, whether statutory or j udge made,  that are un­
j ust or perhaps simply foolish . 
Agreement with these sentiments of Judge Weinstein also requires 
that we be willing to tolerate occasional open refusals by a trial j udge to 
follow the law as it is generally understood. 62 This is a highly controver­
sial proposition that requires elaboration.  I refer to "occasional" refusals 
for both practical and normative reasons. Practically, it is a rare legal rule 
that admits of no doubt and hence of no room for maneuvering around 
an unj ust or nonsensical result. As Judge Weinstein has observed, 
" [t] here are many techniques used by our courts to avoid and circumvent 
dubious and immoral precedents. "63 Normatively, frequent j udicial diso­
bedience by trial judges would exhaust courts of appeals. Far more im­
portant, it could precipitate a constitutional crisis in which j udicial inde­
pendence would be the loser. 
59 . See,  e .g . ,  United States v. Shonubi, 962 F .  Supp. 370 (E .D.N.Y. 1 997) ;  United 
States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F .  Supp. 485 (E .D.N.Y. 1 993) ;  infra text accompanying 
note 1 1 1  ( for further discussion ) .  
60. See supra note 1 6. 
6 1 . Jack B. Wei nstein, Limits on judges ' Learning,  Speaking and Acting-Part !­
Tentative First Thoughts: How May judges Learn?, 36 Ariz. L.  Rev. 539, 562 ( 1 994) . 
62.  I t  may be important to distinguish between settled doctrine  and a rule or 
interpretation recently announced by a court of appeals. In the Eastway case, Judge 
Weinstein and the Court of Appeals were disputing the proper interpretation of a recently 
amended ( 1983) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and one, moreover, that seemingly 
conferred discretion on the trial j udge as to the choice of a sanction. See Eastway, 637 F.  
Supp. at 566-69, 584; supra note '(-.7 and accompanying text. More than just Judge 
Weinstein's  evidently superior understanding of the relevant legal landscape in that case 
inclines me to the view that, in general, distric t  judges should have greater freedom to 
insist that courts of appeals really mean what they say about a new law. Particularly when 
Supreme Court review is only a theoretical possib il i ty, dialogue benveen the courts of 
appeals and the district courts is important for legal development. 
63. Weinstein ,  Nazis , supra note 57, at 1 1 55; see also id. at 1 1 56 ( "Preceden t  can be 
distinguished on many grounds as, for example, by characterizing the ' rule '  as dictum, and 
by finding parallel l ines of authori ty.") ; Jack B .  Weinstein,  Litigation Seeking Changes in 
Public Behavior and Institutions-Some Views on Participation, 13 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 23 1 ,  
233 ( 1 980) Uurisdictional and related concepts may appear to b e  inflexible but 
"sometimes they are soft around the edges and can be adjusted to achieve a sensible 
substantive result" ) .  
1 984 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:1971 
I refer to "open refusals" because I expect a trial j udge to be candid 
about, and take responsibility for, the nature and extent, as well as the 
impact in a particular case, of a departure from the law as generally un­
derstood. For, as Professor Weinstein recognized, " there is no one but 
his fellow judges who can stop him when he proposes to stray beyond 
those ' limits which precedent and c ustom and the long silent and almost 
indefinable practice of other judges . . .  have set to judgemade innova­
tions . '  "64 Moreover, as Judge Weinstein has observed in an article urging 
the importance of j udicial review of administrative action,  "our public 
hearings and written opinions . . .  keep the system honest. . . .  This is one 
of our most important protections against injustice and abuse of 
power."6·" Judge Weinstein was apparently not talking about the "system "  
i n  which h e  works, but his point is equally valid as applied t o  "a com­
pletely independent judiciary. "66 
We do not need Judge Posner to tell us that " U J  udges don ' t  like to 
be reversed," and his chosen focus on appellate judges colors the asser­
tion that "aversion to reversal does not bulk large in the judicial utility 
function. "67 The willingness openly to "risk, or even court, reversal , ''68 is ,  
however, what separates that  which I have provocatively called 'judicial 
disobedience" from judicial nullification. 
If one agrees with this assessment, certain aspects of the j udicial work 
of Jack Weinstein may cause concern from the perspective of judicial in­
dependence and accountability. Before turning to these concerns, i t  
bears repeating that, taken as a whole ,  Judge Weinstein ' s  work represents 
the finest traditions of an independent federal j udiciary. To read his 
1984 article on social security disability cases, for example ,  is to share a 
record of j udicial courage and determination, one that not only bore 
fruit for individual l itigants who had the good fortune to end up in  Judge 
Weinstein 's  courtroom, but also resulted in a change in national policy 
through sustained cri ticism. 69 
64. Weinstein ,  Routine Bifurcation, supra note 25, at 837  ( omission m 
original)  (quoting Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 1 03 ( 1 92 1 ) ) .  
65.  Jack B. ·weinstein, Equality and the Law: Social Security D isabi l i ty Cases i n  the 
Federal Courts, 35 Syracuse L. Rev. 897, 9 1 2  ( 1 984) [herein after Weinste in ,  Social Securi ty 
Disabil ity Cases] .  
66.  Id;  see also Frank, supra note 4, at 288 ('Judicial candor with the public,  I think, is  
the only practice consonant with democracy." ) ; id. at  289 (encouragin g  courts to overturn 
undesirable precedent  openly because " ' [a ]  judiciary that discloses what it is doing and 
why it does it will breed understanding' " (quoting William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 
Colum. L. Rev. 735, 754 ( 1 949) ) ) .  
67 .  Posner, supra note 4, at 1 1 8 .  For a discussion of the 'judicial uti l ity function ," 
which refers to j udges' preferences, or what they try to maximize, as j udges, see id .  at 
1 1 7-26. 
68. \:\'einste in ,  Nazis, supra note 57, at 1 1 56; see also supra text accompanying note 
57. 
69. See Weinstein,  Social Security Disabil ity Cases, supra note 65,  a t  9 1 7  (suggestin g  
that improper pressures by the national administration were weighing agaiust Social 
Security disabil i ty benefi t  claimants ) ;  City of New York v. Heckler, 578 F.  Supp. 1 1 09,  
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There is no doubt that Jack Weinstein has shown himself to be the 
sort of judge that Professor Weinstein encouraged our system to seek in 
i ts judicial appointments:  "mature [ individuals] . . .  who understand inti­
mately legal problems in their social and economic contexts, and who 
have the assurance to be both generous and courageous. "70 
The three possible problems I see in Judge Weinstein 's  work from 
this perspective relate to ( 1 )  standards by which he determines not to 
follow the law as i t  is generally understood, (2) failure to take responsibil­
ity for some of his departures fro m  those laws, and (3 )  lack of respect for 
accountability within the j udiciary. 
1 .  Standm·ds for judicial Disobedience. - :Assuming that our system can 
tolerate occasional open refusals by trial j udges to follow the law as it is 
generally understood (or that occasional open refusals m ay be essential 
to the system's health) , frequent instances ofjudicial disobedience would 
present grave practical and normative problems.  For this reason, there is 
an obvious need for limiting principles or standards to guide and restrain 
j udges in choosing the occasions for disobedience. 
Judge Weinstein recognized the problem in a discussion of j ury nulli­
fication . Although claiming that " [ t ] he heritage of refusing to obey laws 
regarded as unjust in their operation is honored today within all 
branches of the federal government, often for the ' good of the 
Republic ,"' 7 1  Judge Weinstein acknowledged that " [t] he difficulty with 
any tendency to ignore laws is that whether a particular law is unj ust may 
depend entirely on the view of the beholder."72 In the context of jury 
nullification, he took comfort from "procedural safeguards and require­
ments of group decisionmaking. "73 Similar safeguards may not  be avail­
able, and there is no such general requirement, for the work of federal 
trial j udges. 74 
1 1 24 -25 (E.D.N .Y. ) ,  affd, 742 F .2d 729 ( 2d Cir. 1 984) (declaring the Social Security 
Administration's psychiatric review policy illegal ) .  
70. Jack B .  Weinstein, Trends i n  Civil Practice, 6 2  Colum. L .  Rev. 1 43 1 ,  1 433 ( 1 962) 
[ hereinafter ·weinstein, Trends ] .  I t  was confidence that Judge vVeinstein 's  generosity 
extends to his critics, see Burbank, supra n ote 7, that persuaded me to accept the invitation 
to participate in this celebration.  
7 1 . Jack B.  Weinstein,  Considering Jury "Nullification": When May and Should a Jury 
Rej ect the Law to Do Justice, 30 Am. Crim.  L. Rev. 239, 243 ( 1 993)  [hereinafter Wei nstein ,  
J U!)' Nullification] .  
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 245. 
74. See Act of Aug. 1 2 , 1 976, Pub. L. No. 94-381 , 90 Stat. 1 1 19 ( codified at 28 U.S.C.  
§ 2284 ( 1 994) ) ( abolishing most three judge district courts) ; see also Judith Resnik, 
Managerial Judges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 374, 424-3 1 ( 1 982) (arguing that case management 
techniques of trial judges threaten to erode traditional due process safeguards) .  Note, 
however, that one provision of the recen tly introduced Hyde bill would require that 
applications for i njunctive relief (on the ground of unconstitutionality) against a state law 
adopted by referendum be heard, on an expedited basis, by a court of three judges, with 
direct appeal to the Supreme Court. See H . R. 1 252, 1 05th Cong. § 2 ( 1 997 ) . 
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What, then,  are the standards that guide Judge Weinstein when he  
refuses to follow the law as  i t  i s  generally understood? We m ay safely infer 
that he is one of those district  j udges who "have been known to nullify 
when, for example,  they seek to escape the rigors of guideline sentencing 
or when the outcome of a trial totally offends their sense of justice ."75 
Nor do I think it unreasonable to include him among those j udges who 
occasionally "stretch the law to some extent out of sympathy for the liti­
gants and a sense of j ustice ."76 
The principle or  standard for j udicial disobedience emerging from 
Judge Weinstein ' s extramural writings is not  much of a l imitation,  to the 
extent that it turns on the individual j udge's  desire for flexibility, sympa­
thies or "sense ofjustice. "77 Judge Weinstein believes that " [e ] ach Ameri­
can judge is individually beholden to the people and our conscience 
through the Constitution , "78 and that "a  previously enunciated rule can­
not, and should not, prevent an individual American judge from follow­
ing the Consti tution and what he or she considers i ts m oral impera­
tives."79 It may be a long way from the Consti tution to i ts moral 
imperatives and further sti l l  to an individual j udge 's sense ofjustice,  par-
75. Weinstein ,  Jury Nullification ,  supra note 71 , at 243; see infra text accompanying  
notes 1 07-1 1 1 .  
76. Weinste in ,  Jury N ull ification ,  supra note 7 1 ,  at 246; see also, e .g . ,  I n  re DES Cases, 
789 F. Supp. 552,  572 (E.D.N.Y. 1 992) ( "Given the Hymowitz court's decision to forgo joint 
and several liability ,  a DES plaintiffs  full recovery would be frustrated if  all manufacturers 
for pregnancy use could not  be brought into court.") , appeal dismissed, 7 F .3d 20 (2d Cir. 
1 993 ) ;  Jack B. Weinstein ,  Limits o n  Judges' Learning,  Speaking, and Acting: Part I I  
Speaking and Part I I I  Acting, 20 U .  Dayton L. Rev. 1 ,  33-34 ( 1 994)  [ herein after,  
Weinstein,  Limits on Judges II  & I I I ] ;  infra note 1 03 and accompanyin g  text (discussing In 
re DES Cases) ; infra text accompanying note 89 (discussing Agent Orange) . 
This may also be an appropriate vantage point from which to view I n  re Repeti tive 
Stress Injury Cases, 1 42 F .R.D.  584 (E.D.N.Y. 1 992) , rev 'd ,  1 1  F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 1 993) . I n  
addition to chiding Judge Weinstein for "substi tut [ing] a discussion of so-called mass torts 
for precise findings as to what are the 'common questions of law and fact' j ustifying 
consolidation pursuant to" Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,  1 1  F .3d at 373,  
the Court of Appeals n oted that the factors favorin g  consolidati o n  spoke to the 
"convenience of only one side"-the plaintiffs. Id. at 374. 
Note that the examples of "stretching" Judge Weinstein gave in  the article quoted i n  
the text-"landlord-tenant disputes or evictions for mortgage defaults"-are n o t  exactly 
the staple of federal distric t  judges. Weinstein ,  Jury Nullification, supra note 7 1 ,  at 246. 
77.  \IV einstein ,  Jut-y Nullification,  supra note 7 1 ,  at 246; see also Weinste in ,  Mass Tort 
Litigation, supra note 4 ,  at 1 7 1 ( "some fel t  sense of appropriateness" ) ;  Weinste in ,  Social 
Security Disabil i ty Cases, supra note 65 , at 899-900 ("almost certain i n tuition, based on . . .  
knowledge of the law and life, that an  injustice has been done") . 
78. \!\'einste in ,  Nazis, supra n ote 57, at 1 1 54; see also Jack B .  Weinstein,  The Limited 
Power of the Federal Courts of Appeals to Order a Case Reassigned to Another D istrict 
Judge, 1 20 F.R.D. 267, 285 ( 1 988) [ hereinafter Weinstein ,  Limited Power to Reassign ) 
( "On e  of the great strengths of the federal j udicial system has been the strong sense of 
independent power and responsibility of each federal j udge to protect the Constitution 
and laws of the United States. " ) .  
79. Weinstein ,  Nazis, supra note 57, a t  1 1 56.  
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ticularly if " [j ] udges can ignore neither monstrous nor routine 
in  justices. "80 
2 .  Taking Responsibility for judicial Disobedience. I have sought to 
keep separate, and it may be significant that Judge Weinstein apparently 
does not distinguish between, refusal to follow the law as it is generally 
understood-what I have called 'judicial disobedience"-and nullifica­
tion .8 1 The value of the distinction,  if any, l ies in the existence of an 
institutional check on fidelity to the law in one case and the lack of any 
such check in the other. 
According to this view, the j ury in a criminal case engages in nullifi­
cation if its acquittal results from refusal to follow the trialjudge 's  instruc­
tions as to the governing law or if it consciously distorts the facts so as to 
avoid the reach of the law it has been given.  But a federal trial j udge 
commits a qualitatively different act if he or she refuses to follow the law 
as it is generally understood, so long as it is done openly and so long as 
there is a realistic prospect of appellate review. Judicial disobedience, in  
other words, entails willingness to  pay the price of  reversal.82 
A'> previously discussed, it is hard to maintain that appellate review 
still provides effective structural assurance of judicial accountability.83 
Not only have we abandoned a key check on the equitable discretion of 
federal trial judges by restricting interlocutory appeals,84 but we have 
broadened the domain of their discretion as to facts .w' Perhaps even 
more important, we have opened vast new vistas for the exercise of unre­
viewable discretion, and hence of power, by permitting, indeed encourag­
ing, trial judges to become actively involved i n  settlement.86 
Much has been written about the Agent Orange litigation,  in  which 
Vietnam veterans sued chemical m anufacturers, claiming that the herbi­
cide by which the litigation is known caused a host of diseases and condi­
tions from which they suffered. Peter Schuck's  book/'7 together with 
Richard Marcus 's  review essay,88 prompt numerous questions about 
Judge Weinstein 's  handling of the litigation,  howsoever much one may 
80. [d. 
8 1 .  See Weinstein,  Jury Nullification,  supra note 7 1 ,  at 243, 246. 
82.  Cf. Martin Luther King, Jr. ,  Letter from Birmingham City Jail (Apr. 1 6, 1 963) ,  
reprinted i n  A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings of Martin Luther King, Jr. 289, 
294 Uames Melvin Washington ed. ,  1 986)  ("One who breaks an unj ust law must do i t  
o-penly, lovingly . . . and wi th a wil l ingness to accept the penal ty.") . 
83. See supra text accompanying notes 5 1 -56. 
84. See Jack B .  Weinstein & Jonathan B.  v\'iener, Of Sailing Ships and Seeking Facts: 
Brief Reflections on Magistrates and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 62 St. John 's L. 
Rev. 429, 433 ( 1 988)  [hereinafter Weinstein & Wiener, Magistrates] ;  Yeazel!, supra note 
56, at 660-64. 
85 . See supra note 55. 
86. See Yeazell , supra n ote 56, at 656 - 60; Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of 
Complexity, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1 463,  1 483-87 ( 1987) ( review essay) . 
87. Peter H. Schuck, Agent  Orange on Trial: Mass Toxic Disasters in the Courts 
( 1 986) . 
88.  Richard L. Marcus, Apocalypse Now) , 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1 267 ( 1 987) ( review essay) . 
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admire the imagination and determination with which he obtained for 
the plaintiffs a settlement providing money and other benefits to which 
they were not entitled under the existing substantive law.89 
Judge Weinstein 's  opinions on choice of law90 and governmental im­
munity91 also cause concern. Professor Schuck has aptly described the 
choice of law opinion, in which Judge Weinstein conj ured up a "federal 
or a national consensus law of manufacturer's l iability, government con­
tract defense and punitive damages, "92 as a combination of "prestidigita­
tion and rank insubordination, "93 but he has also ventured that it was 
"redeemed only by the m anifest wisdom and fairness of his position."94 
With respect-to both Judge Weinstein and Professor Schuck-! cannot 
agree .  For, as Professor Schuck also notes, Judge Weinstein did his best 
to insulate his "insubordination" from j udicial review.95 The same was 
89. See Weinstein, Mass Tort Litigation, supra note 4, at 1 1  ("The fact  that the science 
did not support a viable cause of action did not warrant ignoring those cries from the heart 
for justice .") : id. at 62, 85-86, 1 52 .  For a detailed account of the settlement negotiations in 
Agent Orange, see Schuck, supra note 87, at 1 43-67. 
90. In re "Agent  Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690 (E .D.N.Y. 1 984) . 
9 1 .  Tn re "Agen t  Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1 242 (E .D.N.Y. ) ,  mandamus 
denied sub nom. In re United States, 733 F.2d 1 0  (2d Cir. ) , appeal dismissed, 745 F.2d 1 6 1  
(2d Cir. 1 984) . 
92. In re "Agent Orange " Prod. Liab. Litig. , 580 F. Supp. at 7 1 3. 
93.  Schuck, supra note 87, at 1 30 ;  see also Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in  Complex 
Litigation, 7 1  N.Y.U .  L.  Rev. 547, 561-64 ( 1 996) . 
The opinion partook of "prestidigitation" because i t  eliminated the choice of law 
problems that would have made class certification impossible under Rule 23 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure by assuming a "national consensus law" that sirnply did not exist. 
Conjure as he might, no "national consensus law" existed on these issues. 
Significantly, he neither cited a case establishing that it did exist nor said what the 
content of that law was or even how one might go about divining i t. That, he 
coyly observed, was "a subj ect  for another memorandum"; his own opinion was 
merely "preliminary" and "provisional," "a first general guide to the parties of the 
court's present thinking," one that was always "subject to refinement and 
change." 
Schuck, supra note 87, at 1 30 (quoting In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 
740, 845-47 (E .D.N .Y. 1 984) ) .  
The opinion partook of "rank insubordination" because, Judge vVeinste in 's  attempted 
distinctions notwithstanding, i t  was inconsistent with an earlier Court of Appeals opinion 
holding that federal common law did not apply to Agent Orange, see In re "Agent  Orange" 
Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987, 993 (2d Cir. 1 980) ,  which was law of the case. See Schuck, 
supra note 87, at 1 28-30. 
94. Schuck, supra note 87, at 1 30. 
95. By c haracterizing his opinion as provisional, Judge Weinstein "practically 
immunized his highly questionable ruling from appellate court review." Id. at 1 3 1 .  
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true of his governmental immunity opinion.96 The strategy worked;97 the 
case was settled, and Judge Weinstein 's  individual vision of j ustice was 
served. 
It is not clear, however, that the system of j ustice was well  served.  It is 
no secret that trial judges m ay wish to insulate their decisions from rever­
sal on appeal and that there are many ways in which they may try to do so.  
If we are permitted to make normative j udgments about such practices, 
rather than simply accept them as part of a util ity function,98 we should 
perhaps draw some distinctions. We m ay, for instance,  be more comfort­
able wi th a trial j udge who takes self-protective action out of concern that 
all of the time and effort devoted to a trial wil l  be wasted because of a 
disagreement about the admissibil i ty of an item of evidence,  or that the 
appellate court cannot accurately grasp the facts from the cold record, 
than we are with a situation like Agent Orange. If so, the reason is proba­
bly found in the j udge 's  attitude toward, and efforts to abide by, the gov­
erning law. 
In Agent Orange Judge Weinstein, pursuing the goal of settlement, 
applied what he knew was not  generally understood as the law, and did 
everything he could to make sure that the train he was conducting was 
not derai led by the Court of Appeals.99 That is not a refusal; i t  is an 
evasion . It is not  judicial disobedience, but nullification: the act of a 
"completely independent" judge who has sought to make the rest of the 
j udiciary irrelevant and any protection against "abuse of power" 1 00 impos-
96. Professor Schuck described how Judge Weinstein shielded the decision from 
review: 
Noting once again that his opinion was only "preliminary" and "tentative," 
designed merely to "assist the parties in preparing for trial," he closed by inviting 
the gO\·ernment to "renew its motion to dismiss at any time."  This invitation, 
however, could not have been seriously intended. Indeed, when the government 
shortly thereafter and on several occasions asked Weinstein to reconsider or 
certify an immediate appeal on the issue, he summarily rejected the request; the 
gO\·ernment, he insisted, must stand trial on May 7,  only two months hence, 
unless a higher court intervened. 
Id. at 1 36 (c i tation omitted) .  
97 .  The governmen t sought and was denied mandamus, and its appeal was dismissed 
as premature. See In re ''Agent  Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp.  1 242 (E.D.N.Y. ) ,  
mandamus denied sub nom. I n  re United States, 733 F.2d 1 0  (2d Cir. ) ,  appeal dismissed, 
745 F.2d 1 6 1  (2d Cir. 1 984) . Judge Weinstein was not successful ,  however, in his efforts to 
"dragoon the government into the [settlement] negotiations." Schuck, supra note 87, at 
1 49 .  
98. See supra text accompanying note 67. 
09. See Schuck, supra note 87, at 1 78-79 (describing Judge Weinstein 's  role in 
settlement, and his desire to avoid appeal ) .  The fact that the Agent Orange settlement ( like 
many settlements)  "creat[ed] in effect a new rule of substantive law," Weinstein, Mass Tort 
Litigation, supra note 4, at 86, does not excuse distortion of the substantive law as a means 
to broker settlement. Cf. Jack B. Weinstein,  Some Reflections on the "Abusiveness" of 
Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299, 301 -02 ( 1 973) [ hereinafter Weinstein,  Class Actions] ( " [ I t  is] 
quite unwise to slip into important changes in substantive law on the happenstance that a 
suit is brought by a class rather than by an individual claimant. " ) . 
1 00 .  See supra text accompanying note 65. 
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sible. In this respect the Agent Orange litigation seems a far cry from the 
tort system Judge Weinstein once described and, notwi thstanding its de­
fects ,  compared favorably with administrative systems because it was "out 
in  the open and independent of government abuse . " 1 0 1  
Agent Orange was a rare and unusual case ,  and one ' s  reaction to its 
irregulari ties may be colored by Judge Weinstein's  accomplishment, not 
j ust in securing money for Vietnam veterans who were in n eed, but in 
creating a structure that has produced benefits far beyond the dollars 
paid by defendantsYl2 ButJudge Weinstein has not confined techniques 
that raise troublesome independence and accountability issues to Agent 
Orange. 
It is perhaps more difficult to accept that Judge Weinstein ' s  ends 
j ustified his means when,  in more ordinary litigation, he required a cor­
porate defendant ( one among many) to defend a lawsuit o n  a theory of 
personal jurisdiction radically at odds with Supreme Court precedent, 
knowing that appellate review was unlikely and that the case would proba­
bly settle . 1 03 The theory was the stuff of a law review article-a creative 
one at that. 1 04 It was (or would have been if the defendant had settled)  
consequential not because i t  won acceptance in the marketplace of ideas, 
nor because it survived the gauntlet of appellate review, but as a result of 
something that looks uncomfortably like brute force. 
As Felix Cohen observed,  the "decision that is 'peculiar' suffers ero­
sion-unless it represents the first salient manifestation of a new social 
force, in which case it soon ceases to be pecul iar. " 1 05 At times Judge 
Weinstein seems to want to have his cake and eat it too :  to be able to 
effect progressive change in the law through the intellectual force of his 
opinions without paying the price of (perhaps only temporary) rebuff 
1 0 1 .  Weinstein, Mass Tort Litigation,  supra note 4, at 1 69. 
1 02. See id. at 1 04-06. 
1 03 .  See In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. 552 ( E.D. N.Y. 1 992 ) ,  appeal dismissed sub 
nom. In re DES Litig., 7 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 1 993) . The case did settle, but the defendant kept 
in ,  the successor to a California manufacturer of DES, refused to participate and secured a 
dismissal for vvan t  of prosecution when the plaintiff declined to present evidence. 
Thereafter, an attempt to take an appeal from Judge Weinstein's order on jurisdiction fell 
afoul of the rule that a judgmen t  win ner  lacks standing to appeal. See DE"\ /,itigation, 7 
F.3d at 23. 
· 
1 04. Judge Weinstein has said about DES Casfs: 
Recently, I had an opportunity to employ some of my views on j urisdiction, 
acquired while working with the law school classes I taught on mass torts. In In re 
DES Cases, I took a position that  was inconsistent  with recent Supreme Court 
opinions, though not, I thought, with underlying principles. 
Weinstein ,  Limits on Judges II & I I I ,  supra note 76, at 33 (footnote omitted) . 
For a critique, see Allan R. Stein ,  Survey of Erie/Federal Common Law Cases and 
Personal Jurisdic tion Cases, 1 992 Newsletter of AALS Section on Conflict of Laws 
(American A.ss 'n  of Law Schs., Washington , D .C. ) , at 39-44. 
1 05 .  Cohen,  supra note 32, at 843. 
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that is a cost of the rule of law. He seeks the "freedom of law professors 
to overrule the [ Supreme] Court. " 1 06 
Finally on the subject of taking responsibility for judicial disobedi­
ence, another recent case- United States v. Londono-suggests that Judge 
Weinstein has difficulty distinguishing between the ordinary and the ex­
traordinary. 107 I t  also reveals the extent of his ingenuity in i nsulating the 
results of his work, if not the reasoning behind them, from appellate scru­
tiny. The j udge ' s  eloquently and persuasively stated objections to the 
Sentencing Guidelines are well known. Indeed, he has used the effort by 
unnamed j udges "to escape the rigors of guideline sentencing" 1 08 as one 
specific example of judicial nullification.  
Yet, one must wonder whether concern for the supposed infertil ity 
problems of a convicted defendant is sufficient reason to confect a sen­
tence that not only flouts the Sentencing Guidelines but seems calculated 
to take the defendant outside of the j urisdiction ( through court-ordered 
deportation)  before there can be appellate review. 1 09 As a result of this 
case,  even one who agrees with Judge Weinstein 's  1988 article disputing 
the power of a court of appeals to order that a case be assigned to an­
other trial j udge on remand 1 10 can better understand the opposmg 
view. I l l  
3. Lack of Respect for Accountability Within the Judiciary. - Judge 
Weinstein is a very bright, learned, and self-assured person-brighter, 
more learned, and more self-assured than all but a handful of the Article 
III  judges who sit, or could conceivably sit, in review of his work. His 
assertion that " [n ] o  federal judge worth his salt cares about a reversal, 
because he invariably knows in his heart that he was right and the higher 
court wrong," 1 1 2 therefore rings true to a scholarly audience, which was 
the audience he was addressing. But the remark was not seriously in­
tended 1 1 1 and, in any event, is hard to square with Judge Weinstein ' s  at­
tempts to avoid appellate review, if not with his judge-centered theory of 
1 06. Burbank, supra note 2 ,  at 660; see also supra text accompanying note 2. 
1 07. 1 00 F.3d 236 ( 2d Cir. 1 996) . 
1 08. Weinstein,  Jury Nullification, supra note 7 1 ,  at 243; see also supra text 
accompanying note 75. 
1 09. See Londono, 1 00 F.3d at 238. 
1 1 0. See Weinstein,  Limited Power to Reassign , supra note 78. V\'he n  he wrote the 
article,  Judge Weinstein had not himself "been subject to such an order." Id. at 267. 
I l l . In  Londono, the Court of Appeals directed that "further proceedings be assigned 
to a different judge," 100 F.3d at 242, noting that the "district  court's handling of this case 
has several troubling aspects ,"  id., and "makes an exorbitant claim on appellate resources." 
Id. at 243. 
Londono surely made even more delicious the recent opportunity Judge Weinstein 
had, and took, to demonstrate that a reduced sentence ordered by the Court of Appeals, 
although "desirable as a matter of policy and fairness," was the result of a "techn ique and 
rationale . . .  of dubious validity." United States v. Shonubi , 962 F. Supp. 370, 371  
(E.D. N.Y. 1997) . 
1 1 2.  Weinstein,  Social Securi ty Disability Cases, supra note 65, at 897. 
1 1 3 .  Here is the entire passage. I leave i t  to you whether Judge Weinstein was serious: 
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judicial independence. To  h i s  credit, and quite characteristically, Judge 
Weinstein has frankly identified questions concerning the nature of j udi­
cial independence under the Constitution,  and in particular 1vhether "an 
independent j udge [ is ]  independent from his fellow j udges or  only from 
encroachment by the legislature and executive . " 1 1 4 His  work leaves no 
doubt about his  answer to that question.  
Judge Weinstein's theory of independence, according to which every 
federal j udge is accountable " to the people and [his or her]  conscience 
through the Consti tution," 1 1 5 seems to leave l ittle room for formal institu­
tional responses to the misconduct of a federal judge. Or so I interpret 
Judge Weinstein's  assertion that 1 980 legislation 1 1 6 that was designed to 
provide a supplement to the impeachment process within the j udici­
ary, 1 1 7  was "in large part unconsti tutional . " 1 1 8  In matters pertaining to 
judicial accountability, Judge Weinstein is a strict  constructi onist, parsing 
statutes and denying claims of the inherent power of appellate courts in  a 
fashion and with an attitude quite different from that which characterizes 
his own exercises of power. 1 19 
Indeed, although Judge Weinstein h as acknowledged that effective 
appellate review is necessary to prevent '"j udicial despotism, "' 1 20 in  re­
cent years he appears to have come to regard courts of appeals as sources 
of "outside interference," or worse, "threats to the independence of fed-
I d. 
But I regret to say that the titles of scholar and judge are incompatible. 
Judges cannot be scholars. If they were to try, as a scholar would, to understand 
the ful l  complexity of every case, their decisions would never be timely. All that 
work-a-day judges like myself can do is to mingle  whenever possible with scholars 
and students like yourselves in the hope that some of your knowledge and insight 
v.-ill rub off. No federal judge worth h is salt cares about a reversal, because he 
i nvariably knows in  his heart that he was right and the higher court wrong. But 
when a law review article or student note says he  was mistaken ,  then  he worries. 
1 1 4. Weinstein,  Limited Power to Reassign , supra note 78, at 272. 
1 15 .  Weinstein,  Nazis, supra note 57, at 1 1 54. 
1 1 6. See 28 U.S.C. § 372 ( c )  ( 1 994) . For a discussion of the 1 980 Act, see Stephen B. 
Burbank, Procedural Rulemaking U nder the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial 
Conduct and Disability Act of 1 980, 1 3 1  U. Pa. L. Rev. 283 ( 1 982) . 
1 1 7 .  See National Commission Report, supra note 33, at 83. 
1 1 8. Weinstein,  Limited Power to Reassign, supra note 78, at 272. I t  was not helpful 
to the i ndependence of the judiciary for Judge Weinstein, as chief judge of a district  court, 
simply to assert that an act of Congress was unconstitutional, let alone one that seeks to 
enhance the accountability of the j udicial)'· This is not  to say that discussion and debate of 
such questions is inappropriate. See generally Harry T. Edwards, Regulating Judicial 
Misconduct and D ivining "Good Behavior" for Federal Judges, 87 Mich. L .  Rev. 765 ( 1 989) 
(arguing that in matters not involving impeachable or criminal conduct judicial self­
regulation is proper approach to uphold the tradition ofjudicial independence) ; Burbank, 
supra n ote 26, at 226-27 (disagreeing with Judge Edwards on whether Congress has a role 
to play in  handling judicial misconduct fall ing short of impeachable conduct) . 
1 1 9 .  See generally Weinstein,  Limited Power to Reassign, supra note 78 (questioning 
both inherent and statutory authority of an appeals panel to order that a case be 
reassigned upon remand) . 
1 20. Id .  at 280 ( quoting H .R. Rep. No.  50-942, at 4 ( 1 888) ) .  
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eral trial judges. "  That is, in any event, how he recently characterized 
interlocutory appeals, lumping them with the practice of ordering reas­
signment on remand. 1 2 1 
II. IMAGINATION AND IDEOLOGY 
vVhat accounts for these problematic aspects of the work of a great 
j udge? The record, like the man, is too complex to afford an easy answer 
or perhaps any answer that will gain wide assent.  Even if I am correct that 
Judge Weinstein remains Professor Weinstein in his approach to ques­
tions of independence and accountabil i ty, that is an insufficiently nour­
ishing account of the behavior in question .  I therefore consider norma­
tive j ustifications of a judge-centered approach to independence that 
Judge Weinstein himself has offered.  I also consider explanations that 
are suggested by, but that may ultimately confound, the economic theory 
of judicial behavior. 
A. Imagination (Power) 
Trial judges have much to learn from [William] James. 
With his marked poetic insight, which made him the despair of 
sedate, "classical , "  psychologists, he went far in exploring the 
jungles of the human mind. Judging, especially in trial courts, 
calls for such poetic  insight. For poetry, which involves synthetic 
imagination , gives "an inclusive understanding of si tuations" in 
a way that "analytic reason" cannot. 1 22 
Academics tend to prize creativity more than they do learning, and 
they prize most of all the two in combination . When Jack Weinstein was a 
professor, academic law was a recognizable discipline ;  its orientation was 
doctrinal, and if only because of that orientation, scholars who could de­
ploy their creativity and learning in directions that were thought to have 
practical payoffs were especially esteemed. Professor Weinstein was such 
a scholar. 
As humbling as Jack Weinstein 's  multiple,  various and continuing 
careers may be, 1 23 consider what he accomplished before he became a 
1 21. See Weinstein & Wiener, Magistrates, supra note 84, at 433 & n . l 9; cf. Weinstein,  
Fiftieth Anniversary, supra note 6, at 25 ( noting that statuto!)' l imitations on intermediate 
appeals are in part responsible for an increase in "plaintiffs' capacity to enforce substantive 
rights") .  Compare the far more sanguine view of courts of appeals espoused by Professor 
Weinstein in approving " [ t] aking new evidence and considering new theories of law on 
appeal . . .  so long as the l i tigants are notified and have an opportunity to advocate their 
views on the matter."  vVeinstein,  Trends, supra n ote 70, at 1 443. Even then,  however, he 
noted the danger " that the shift of responsibil i ty upward will reduce the prestige of the 
lower courts and lead to a failure to assume responsibility by trial j udges in cases in which 
they should face up to hard decisions." ld. 
1 22 .  Frank, supra note 4, at 397 (footnotes omitted ) .  
1 23 .  See supra text accompanying note 4. 
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j udge . In only fifteen years 1 24 he became one of the country' s  foremost 
scholars in both civil procedure and evidence and in his spare time 
helped to solve New York' s  motor vehicle problems, 1 25 rewrote New 
York's Civil Practice Act, 1 26 and started work on the first comprehensive 
reform of the law of evidence in the United States. 1 27 
Representative of Professor Weinstein's  scholarship in  this period i s  
a 1 96 1  article he published on bifurcation of jury negligence trials . 1 2s 
The article is striking because Weinstein was so far ahead of most of his  
contemporaries in recognizing, and seriously engaging, the substantive 
i mpact of procedure and i ts implications for court rulemaking. It is also 
noteworthy because it reflects the fruits of rare commodities (in 1 96 1  or 
1 997) , 1 29 comparative civil procedure no and the use of empirical data. 1 " 1 
Like his other work, the article reveals a powerful and restless mind at 
work, refusing to be cabined by either conventional wisdom or conven­
tional techniques. 
Skip from 1 96 1  to 1 997, and from the work of Professor Weinstein to 
the work of Judge Weinstein .  Presiding over related civil and criminal 
fraud cases, Judge Weinstein used "an integrated civi l  settlement and a 
criminal restitution order . . .  to assure maximum recovery by the victims 
with minimum transactional costs . " \'02 Although the Judge asserted that 
" [ c] ombining criminal and c ivi l proceedings, or aspects of those proceed­
ings, is not novel ,"  the references in support of that proposition are to 
articles discussing the procedural systems of Sweden and France . ' "" That 
is because the idea for the procedure Judge Weinstein devised was 
"sparked in part" by an international conference on comparative civil jus-
1 24 .  Weinstein joined the Columbia Law School faculty in 1 95 2  and became a judge 
111 1 967. 
1 :!5. From 1 952 to 1 954, Weinstein was counsel to the New York Joint  Legislative 
Committee on Motor Vehicle Problems. 
1 26. From 1 955 to 1 958 Weinstein was Reporter of the Advisory Committee on 
Practice and Procedure of the New York State Temporary Commission on Courts, and 
from 1 963 to 1 966 he was a member of the Advisory Committee on Practice of the New 
York Judicial Conference. 
1 27. Professor Weinstein was appointed to the Advisory Committee on Rules of 
Evidence of the .Judicial Conference of the L:nited States in  1 965, and he  continued service 
(un til 1 975) after h is appoin tment as a district judge. 
1 :!8 .  See Weinstein ,  Routin e  Bifurcation, supra note 25. 
1 29 .  See Burbank, supra note 5 ,  at 1 928 (deploring failure to base procedural rules 
on empirical foundation ) ; John H. Langbein,  The Influence of ComparatiYe Procedure in  
the  United States, 43 Am. J .  Comp. L .  545 ,  545 ( 1 995)  ( discussing disturbing fact that 
" [ t ] he study of comparative procedure has l ittle following in academia, and virtually n o  
audience in the courts or legal policy circles" ) . 
1 30 .  See vVeinstein,  Routin e  Bifurcation,  supra note 25, at 83 1 n .*  ( noting that article 
grew out of work on German procedural devices ) .  
1 3 1 .  See id. a t  847-52; see also supra text accompanying note 25.  
1 32 .  United States v. Cheung, 952 F. Supp. 1 48 ,  1 48 (E .D .N.Y. 1 997) . 
1 33.  Id .  at 1 50. 
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tice reform that he had attended in Florence in 1 996. 1 34 But the Judge 
also brought to bear on the problem his extraordinary experience in ,  and 
his perspectives on, class actions, conducting proceedings that could be 
"likened to Rule 23 fairness hearings . . .  not only to inform the court, but 
to assure the victims (many of whom were unaware of the workings of the 
American justice system) that they were being treated fairly. " 1 33 
Not content to implement a strikingly innovative approach inspired 
in part by his forays among scholars , Judge Weinstein,  ever the scholar 
himself, identified potential "unnecessary problems and possible injus­
tices" in  the coordinated conduct of civil and criminal proceedings . 1 36 
All of this in an opinion of eight double-spaced pages ! 
For Judge Weinstein,  as for Professor Wei nstein,  a major  value of 
independence-academic and judicial-inheres in  the "latitude for ex­
perimentation" it affords . 1 37  It is this quality that prompted him to liken 
the courtroom to a classroom. 1 38 According to this view, both legal pro­
gress and the capacity to attract to the bench intelligent and creative peo­
ple require that individual judges not feel that they are "straightjacketed 
by the current consensus interpretation of ambiguous national rules . '' l: �9 
It is ,  in  other \Vords, a view that essentially equates independence with 
discretion,  and hence wi th power, 1 40 and imputes to it values that relate 
both to legal development and to the uti l ity function of j udges: 
The reality is that judicial and administrative discretion pervade 
our system at all levels. Such flexibil ity invites creativity, stimu­
lates innovation , and in good measure is responsible for the at­
traction that law holds for our brightest young minds. To the 
public ,  however, it is undoubtedly a source of frustration and 
cynicism . 1 4 1 
This bears some resemblance to Judge Posner's explanation of the 
reasons why 'j udges adhere to stare decisis but not rigidly," 1 ·1:! an explana­
tion that is, however, ultimately unsatisfying: 
[ I ] f  there is no felt choice, there is no  pleasure in choosing. 
That may be why so many district judges held the federal sen-
1 34.  Letter from Jack B.  Wei nstein to Stephen B. Burbank Uanuaiy 1 4, 1 997) ( copy 
on file with the Columbia Law Review) . 
1 35 .  Cheu ng, 952 F. Supp. at 1 5 1 .  
1 36. l ei .  a t  1 50. Judge v\'ei ns tein discusses problems arising from the prohibition on 
trial court involvement in plea negotiations and from the n eed to assure that the 
defe ndan t has adequate resources to support his  or her fami ly if circumstances ch ange 
after sentencing. See icl. at  1 50-5 1 .  
1 37 .  Weinste in ,  Barriers to J us tice,  supra note I ,  a t  1 9 1 1 .  
1 38. See supra text accom panying note l .  
1 39 .  vVeinstei n ,  Barriers to J ustice, supra n o te 1 ,  at 1 9 1 1 ;  see also supra text 
accompanying note l .  
1 40. See Burbank, supra note 86, at 1 470 ( 'Those responsible for procedural reform 
know that discretion is an instrument of power. " ) . 
1 4 1 .  Jack B .  Wei nste in ,  . Justice and Mercy-Law and Equi ty, 28 N.Y. L. Sch.  L. Re\'. 
81 7, 8 18  ( 1 984) [ h e reinafter Weinstein ,  justice and Mercy] . 
1 42 .  Posner, supra n o te 4, at 1 25 .  
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tencing guidelines unconsti tutional . They believed that the 
guidelines would turn criminal sentencing, formerly an area of 
almost unlimited district-judge discretion, into a process of 
mechanical, but laborious, computation . 1 43 
The notion that power is important to an understanding of judicial be­
havior is not restricted to those who take an economic approach to 
law. 1 44 But judge Posner has provided an interesting summary of recent 
work that analyzes judges' power "as a source of satisfaction,  or even of 
exhilaration,  akin to that experienced by creative people . " 1 45 His discus­
sion suggests that j ust as " [a] rtists impose their aesthetic vision on soci­
ety [ , ]  judges impose their political vision on society." 1 46 
Judge Posner's application of economic theory to the j udiciary, and 
the literature on which he relies, 1 47 are primarily concerned with appel­
late ( collegial )  courts .  It is this focus that leads to his assertion that 
judges impose "their political vision on society . . .  mainly through the 
precedential force of their decisions, since a single decision rarely has a 
great impact." 1 4s And the same focus suggests a " trade- off between the 
loss of power that results from judges ' following their predecessors '  deci­
sions rather than innovating and the loss of power that results if, by refus­
ing to follow their predecessors' decisions, . . .  they reduce the l ikelihood 
that their successors will follow their decisions . " 1 49 
The calculus is different for trial j udges, particularly in the age of 
managerial judging, aggregation, and settlement. 1 50 If Agent Orange has 
taught us-and that includes Judge Weinstein-anything, i t  is that single 
"litigations," 1 " 1 if not s ingle decision�, can have a great impact indeed. 
:VIoreover, trial judges bent on maximizing their power are not likely to 
1 43.  I d .  (footnote omitted) ; cf. Jack B. Weinstein ,  A Trial Judge 's Second Impression 
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S.  Gal . L Rev. 357, 366 ( 1 99 2 )  [hereinafter 
·weinstein. Federal Sentencing Guidelines) ( "But  use of the guidelines does tend to 
deaden the sense that a j udge must treat each defe ndant as a unique human being. The 
present  system contributes to the bureaucratic mentality described by Hannah Arendt in 
her an:llysis of the 'banality of evil . "' (footnote omitted) (quoting Hannah Arendt,  
Eichmann in Jerusalem (2d eel. 1 964) ) ) .  
1 44. See, e .g . ,  Stephen B .  Burbank, Procedure and Power, 4 6  J .  Legal Educ. 5 1 3, 
5 1: � - 1 5  ( 1 996) . See generally Burbank, supra note 86, at 1 47 1 -76. 
1 45 .  Posner,  supra note 4 ,  at 1 2 1 .  
1 46. !d.  
1 47.  See. e .g. ,  Lewis A. Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial Courts I :  Path-Dependence ,  
1 2  Int ' l  Rev. L & Econ. 1 69, 1 80-85 ( 1 992) (arguing that collegial ity among appellate 
judges determines the path of the law) . 
1 48.  Posner, supra note 4, at 1 2 1 .  
1 49.  I d.  ( footnote omitted) . 
1 50.  See generally Resnik ,  supra note 74 (assessing increased power of trial j udges 
t·esulting from pretrial managerial judging, which is rarely reviewable ) ;  Yeazel l ,  supra note 
56 ( contending that trial courts are equipped wi th increasingly extensive procedural tools, 
yet appel late courts have not accordingly increased their supervisory powers ) .  
1 5 1 .  "My practice i s  generally to concentrate o n  l itigations. "  Letter from .Jack B .  
\,\.einstein to Stephen B .  Burbank Uune 1 1 , 1 996) (copy o n  file with the Columbia Law 
Re\iew) . 
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pause long over the trade-off posited in Judge Posner's discussion, if they 
perceive it as applicable to them at all .  Finally, it seems equally true of 
trial as of appellate judges that, although criticism for flouting precedent  
is a cost, i t  "may well  be outweighed by  the gain . . .  from changing policy 
in the direction [ the judge] desires ." 1 52 
The theory that treats j udges' power "as a source of satisfaction, or 
even of exhilaration, akin to that experienced by creative people ," 153  may 
have some explanatory force when applied to the work of Jack Weinstein . 
Not only is that theory consistent with a number of his own statements 
about the judicial function, i t  also helps to explain behavior of Judge 
Weinstein that is otherwise puzzling. 
I have noted that Judge Weinstein does not always distinguish ordi­
nary from extraordinary cases for the purpose of judicial disobedience or 
nullification Y "4 Professor Mullenix has seen in Judge Weinstein ' s  at­
tempt to assimilate mass tort l i tigation to public law litigation the desire 
to "intervene assertively in mass tort cases to impose court-ordered solu­
tions, just as he did in school desegregation and mental health cases ." 1 c' 5  
Both phenomena may reflect the desire to maximize opportunities for 
judicial behavior that is i tself extraordinary and that affords extraordinary 
satisfaction.  
This seems a more plausible explanation of Judge Weinstein ' s  at­
tempts to consolidate stress disorder cases than the efficiency rationale he 
offered after he was reversed by the Court of Appeals . 1 56 For, as the 
Court of Appeals suggested, mass torts can become a "self-fulfilling 
prophecy" 1 57 at the hands of a j udge for whom the intellectual challenges 
of complexity may sometimes obscure i ts costs .  t ss 
1 52 .  Posner, supra note 4 ,  at 1 22.  
1 53 .  Id. at 1 2 1 .  
1 54 .  See supra text accompanying notes 1 03 - 1 1 1 . 
1 55 .  Mullenix, supra note 4, at 580; see also id. at 58 1 -82 (comparin g  mass torts with 
"public law" consti tutional l i tigation of the 1 960s) . 
1 56 .  Case by case disposition seems to me to be unsuitable for what may be many 
thousands of stress disorder cases. . . . The Court of Appeals has not. in my 
opinion, sufficiently considered the efficiency of having one decision on the 
science issues instead of, as in Bendectin ,  many decisions by trial and appellate 
courts all over the country. Expenses to plaintiffs are i ncreased since each must 
pay a substantial fil ing fee. Con trol of discovery by many magistrate j udges 
instead of one is duplicative and less effective ; the work of many j udges and 
magistrate judges is needed to control discovery. 
Weinstein ,  Mass Tort Litigation,  supra note 4 ,  app. at 352-53 (citations omitted) . Judge 
·weinstein had not previously been wel l  knmvn as a proponent of efficiency-based 
rationales for procedural solutions to l itigation problems. See Jack B. \\'e instein ,  
P rocedural Reform as a Surrogate for Substantive Law Revision,  59 Brook. L. Rev. 827,  829 
( 1 993)  [ hereinafter Weinstein .  Procedural Reform] ;  Weinstein,  Barriers to Justice, supra 
note 1 ,  at 1 906; infra text accompanying notes 1 7 1-1 72 .  
1 57 .  In re Repetitive Stress I njury Litig. , 1 1  F.3d 368,  374 (2cl Cir. 1 993 ) .  
1 58 .  See generally Burbank, supra note 8 6  (discussing costs of complex l i tigation ) .  
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The possibility that Judge Weinstein ' s  utility function drives h im to 
seek (or create) the extraordinary in preference to the ordinary-"litiga­
tions" rather than cases-may also help to explain apparen t  inconsisten­
cies that are surprising in one so intelligent and so pragmatic .  Professor 
Schuck discussed inconsistencies between the Judge ' s  treatment of indi­
vidual (opt-out) plaintiffs and members of the class in Agent Orange, 
which included letting the individuals suffer "premature dismissal" that 
the Judge had recognized as problematic for the class . " >9 Judge 
Weinstein also is not consistent in that he fails to recognize that, j ust as 
premature aggregation in a class action may seriously prej udice the ability 
of those who have been injured to establish a right to recover under the 
governing substantive law, so may other forms of aggregation,  such as 
consolidation. 1 60 
I t  cannot be,  however, that Judge Weinstein ' s  judge-centered theory 
of independence and accountability reflects only the Judge ' s  desire to 
exercise power in order to maximize purely personal satisfaction . Nor is 
that the only possible interpretation of Judge Posner's discussion of the 
economic analysis of j udicial behavior. Recall that the satisfaction or ex­
hilaration he posited derived from 'judges impos [ing] their political vi­
sion on society. " 1 6 1 This suggests that we should also consider whether 
ideology plays a part in Judge Weinstein ' s  approach to his role as a federal 
judge. In doing so,  we may be led to agree with Professor Geyh ' s  critique 
of public choice theory. As he points out, "self-interest explains j udicial 
conduct only if self-i nterest is defined broadly to account for other­
oriented behavior. With such a definition , however, the public choice 
model becomes tautological and explains nothing." 1 6:2 
B. Ideolog)' 
Because there are so many ordinary judges ,  and because 
anti-intellectualism,  democratic egalitarianism , and suspicion of 
officials run deep in the American soul, there is even a cult of 
ordinariness in  judging. Exceptionally able judges arouse suspi­
cion of having an "agenda," that is ,  of wanting to be something 
more than j ust corks bobbing on the waves of l itigation or 
umpires calling balls and strikes. Some judges have had political 
agendas, but there is no correlation between being exception­
ally able and having such an agenda. ! 63 
1 59 .  See Schuck, supra note 8 7 ,  at 1 82-83, 242-43.  
1 60. See v\'einstein,  Mass Tort Litigation,  supra note 4, at 352-53 .  But see In  re Breast 
Implant Cases, 942 F. Supp. 958, 9 6 1  (E .D.N.Y. & S .D.N.Y. 1 996)  ( denying motion for 
summary judgment because scientists were still developing relevan t information ) ;  infra 
text accompanying note 1 80.  
1 6 1 .  Posner, supra note 4 ,  at 1 2 1 ;  see also supra text accompanying note 1 46. 
1 62.  Geyh, supra note 32,  at 1 2 1 6  (footnote omitted) ;  see also id .  at 1 2 1 3  & n . 2 5 1  
(contrasting public choice theory of judicial decision-making wi th j udges · ideological 
motivations) . 
1 63. Posner, supra note 4, at I I  0. 
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Having previously described the way in which Judge ·weinstein 
painted "the personality of our legal system" 1 64 as a "combination of per­
sonal politics and wishful thinking, " 1 65 and being anxious to avoid misun­
derstanding, I should define my terms. 1 66 Judges are bound to have be­
liefs about both the appropriate role of, and appropriate policies or goals 
for, government, some of which they are bound to translate into law. 
That is not only because j udges are human . 1 67 It results as well from the 
fact  that in our system "the line betw·een law and policy . . .  is blurred 
[because] [ m ]  any cases cannot be decided by reasoning from conven­
tional legal materials [and] [s] uch cases require the j udge to exercise a 
legislative judgment. " l 6S 
A judge 's  political beliefs, his or  her policy preferences, should not 
cause concern unless they hold sway with such power as to be impervious 
to adjudicative facts,  competing policies, or the governing law as it is gen­
erally understood. When an individual ' s  belief system about social needs 
or aspirations is that powerful, it seems fair to speak of ideology. 1 69 And 
on this understanding, ideology is revealed as the enemy of judicial 
independence. 1 70 
One way an individual judge 's  policy preferences can be,  or can be­
come, "impervious" to law is through nullification. We should, therefore, 
consider whether conflicts in recent years between Judge Weinstein and 
the Court of Appeals turn on matters not of independence but of ideol­
ogy. That seems a possible interpretation of his attempts to insulate from 
appellate review his work in Agent Orange and other cases, at least if one 
also credits his statements about appellate review as a necessary check on 
1 64 .  Weinste in ,  Fiftieth Ann iversary, supra note 6, at 29. 
1 65 .  Burbank, supra note 7 ,  at 32-33 .  
1 66. S e e  Cohen,  supra note 32, at 836 ("A defi n i tion is i n  fact  a type of insurance 
against certain risks of confusion ." ) . 
1 67 .  vVhen a l l  is said a n d  done, we m ust face the fact  that j udges are human. 
That should not dismay those of us  who cherish democracy. For in a democracy 
i t  is imperative never to forget that p ublic offices are, of necessity, held by mere 
men, who, of course , have h uman foibles. It is only where government officials 
are deemed to be semi-divine that  people have any excuse for ignoring the 
ineluctable personal fac tor in government. 
Frank, supra note 4 ,  at 4 1 0  (footnote omitted) .  
1 68. Posner, supra note 4 ,  a t  1 3 1 .  
1 69. See Edward Shils, The Concept and Function of Ideology, in 7 International 
Encyclopedia of th e Social Sciences 66 (David L. Sills ed. , 1 968) .  1 recognize that one 
person 's  " ideol ogy'" is another's  "perspective" or "world-view."  Howard Lesnick,  The 
Wellsprings of Legal Responses to I nequality: A Perspective on Perspectives, 1 99 1  Duke 
LJ. 4 1 3, 4 1 3 - 1 4  & n .3 . That is why I am careful to define " ideology" for these purposes. 
1 70 .  [W] e put j udicial i ndependence at risk when we appoint to the bench those 
who are prisoners of a character, a physical or mental disabi l i ty, or of any other 
human fai l ing that, in a j udge, m ay render the fruits of the j udicial  rrocess 
i rrelevant. . . .  [A] ccorcl ing to this view, because ideologues of any political stri pe 
are not truly i ndependent, a conscious effort to secure their  appointment to the 
federal bench would be an attack on judicial independence. 
Burbank, supr<1 note 3 1 ,  at  1 20 ( footnote omi tted ) .  
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abuse of power. This interpretation may also be consistent with Judge 
Weinstein ' s  description of appellate concern over the possible costs of 
aggregating civil cases as "a form of closing the courthouse door that rep­
resents a shifting of the balance of substantive law in favor of defend­
ants . " 1 7 1  Finally, i t  may help to explain his assertion that " [a] ppellate 
courts are showing an increased tendency to lean toward defendants in 
[mass tort] cases. " 1 72 
My study of Jack Weinstein 's  work suggests that there are three ideas 
that exercise a consistently powerful influence on his j udicial behavior, so 
powerful that they may at times lead him to neglect competing policies or 
to depart from the law as it is generally understood, and in  that sense m ay 
be thought ideological . These three ideas-access, communication, and 
empathy-are related, perhaps interdependent. 
1 .  Access. -
The erection of barriers to court access under the guise of 
procedural efficiency seems misguided and shortsighted :  i t  will 
burden the weak and the aggrieved unfairly, and i t  ultimately 
will undermine the legitimacy of the legal system which most of 
these "reformers" hold dear. 173 
Judge Weinstein has a passionate commitment to access to the courts 
for those who are aggrieved, a commitment consistently reflected in his 
decisions as a judge and in his extrajudicial wri tings. I t  was alertness to 
this value that led him to refuse to apply a state ethical rule on responsi­
bility for the costs of li tigation when doing so would impede the purposes 
of the federal class action rule . 1 74 It was in part concern about access for 
those seeking to assert state law claims that influenced his opinion on 
federal preemption under the Federal Insecticide , Fungicide and Roden­
ticide Act ( FIFRA) . 1 75 And he has voiced a similar concern about access 
in response to appellate decisions restricting the abil i ty of federal district  
judges to consolidate cases under Rule 42 . 1 76 
1 7 1 .  Weinstein,  Mass Tort Litigation,  supra n ote 4, at 353. 
1 72 .  Id.  at 1 74 n.3: cf. id. at ':223 n.32 ( arguing that success of aggregation in mass tort 
litigation depends on personalities of participants ) .  
1 73. Weinstein,  Barriers to Justice, supra note 1 ,  a t  1 906.  
1 74.  See County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co. ,  7 1 0  F. Supp .  1 407,  1 4 1 3- 1 5  
( E.D.N.Y. 1 989) , affd,  907 F.2d 1 295 ( 2 d  Cir. 1 990) ; accord Rand v .  l\lonsanto Co. ,  926 
F.2d 596 ( 7th Cir. 1 99 1 ) ;  cf. Stephen B .  Burbank, State Ethical Codes and Federal Practice:  
Emerging Confliw; and Suggestions for Reform, 19 Fordham Urb. L.J .  969, 9 70-72 ( 1 992)  
(discussing conflicts between federal procedural rules and local distric t  court rules that 
incorporate provisions of state codes of professional conduct) . 
1 75 .  See Burke v. Dow Chem. Co. ,  797 F. Supp. 1 1 28, 1 1 32 (E .D .N.Y. 1 992) ( 'Too 
ready a tendency to declare the state protective shield replaced by the still somewhat spotty 
federal protections will leave many injured persons without recourse. " )  ( discussing F IFRA., 
7 u . s.c §§ 1 36-1 36y ( 1 994) ) .  
I 76. Fed. R. Civ. P .  42.  See supra text accompanying note I 72.  These examples 
hardly do justice to Judge v\'einstcin 's  commitmen t  to access. For addi tional examples, 
see, e .g . ,  Weinstein ,  Social Security Disability Cases, supra note 65,  at 935 (discussing 
Eastern District Ci,il Litigation Fund and pro bono panel ) .  
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I share Judge Weinstein's commitment to preserving access to the 
courts for those who are aggrieved and his discomfort with experiments 
to restrict court access that may themselves be the product  of ideology. 1 77 
I also acknowledge that, taking a broader view of the federal court system 
today, some m ay regard his efforts to ensure access for those who feel 
aggrieved as, if not a cry in the wilderness, then a brave attempt to stem a 
tide of heartlessness and greed masquerading as efficiency. Nonetheless, 
I worry that Judge Weinstein may be insufficiently attentive to ( 1 )  the 
problems that defendants m ay confron t  in achieving effective access to the 
judicial process at the trial level and to (2) the fact  that access should 
include access to appellate review. 
Judicial disobedience in promoting, and subsequently insulating 
from appellate review, 1 78 j udicially confected and brokered settlements is  
hard to square with a commitment to access for all . A recent decision by 
Judge Weinstein and judge Baer, coordinating the management of breast 
implant cases in the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York, raises a 
similar concern. 1 79 They refused to grant a defense motion for summary 
judgment as to some ( the most serious) plaintiffs ' claims, which were ad­
mittedly not adequately supported,  on the ground that scientific evidence 
migh t  be forthcoming to shore them up. At the same time, and over 
defendants '  objection, they severed for trial other claims for which ade­
quate proof might be available. 180 
Many years ago, Judge Weinstein wrote that " [ c] lass actions favor 
plaintiffs. There is no doubt about it." 18 1  Yet, as Professor Yeazell has 
demonstrated, that has not always been true,  and recent developments in 
class action practice, together with recently proposed amendments to 
Rule 23, reveal the potential of the class action to favor defendants as 
well . 1 82 As Professor Yeazell also notes, these developments may augur 
genuine procedural neutrality. 1 H3 
I recognize, of course,  that many plaintiffs confront more substantial 
obstacles to court access than do many defendants .  But "many" is not all . 
In any event, as I have argued elsewhere ,  " [n ]  either judges nor proce­
dural reformers have a general charter to reform society, and broad-scale 
1 77.  See Burbank, supra note 5, at 1 947-48 ("Theory is an irresponsible basis for 
lawmaking about something as important  as access to court, and it is especially 
irresponsible when the lawmaking involves judicial amendment of a Rule [Rule 1 1 ]  that, in 
part because of access concerns, only barely escaped the bright light of the democratic 
process ." ) . 
1 78. See supra text accompanying notes 87-1 0 1 .  
1 79 .  See I n  re Breast Implant Cases, 942 F. Supp. 958 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1 996) .  
1 80 .  See id. a t  963. 
1 81 .  Weinstein, Class Actions, supra note 99, at 300. 
1 82 .  See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Past and Future of Defendant and Settlement 
Classes in Collective Litigation, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 687, 703 ( 1997) . 
1 83. See id. at 704. 
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social reform would b e  necessary t o  eradicate the non-neutral effects of 
many, and perhaps most, procedural rules. " 1 84 
"Procedural camouflage" 1 85 can be used to broaden, as well as to 
restrict, access, and I agree with Judge Weinstein that " [ t] he public is 
entitled to be aware of and participate in the law reform process." 1 86 
When the law in question is not a court rule, but rather j udge-made law, 
participation requires effective access to the j udicial process for all parties 
and proceedings that are open to the public . 1 87 The " legitimacy of the 
legal system" 1 88 is equally at stake . 
Finally, if we are concerned about the effect of inequality of re­
sources as between plaintiffs ( and/or their agen ts)  and defendants (and/ 
or their agen ts)  on access to court, as pragmatists we should also be con­
cerned about the possible results of the same inequality on access to the 
legislature in effecting civil justice reform . The concern is that a per­
ceived tilt by the courts toward plaintiffs may lead to legislation that 
blocks or seriously impedes access to court. As the Private Securities Liti­
gation Reform Act of 1 995 1 89 demonstrates, perception in Washington 
does not depend upon facts . 1 90 
2 .  Communication. -
The judge should, i t  is submitted, expose himself or herself on a 
person-to-person basis to the emotional and other needs of the 
litigants . This proposition requires a shift from the traditional 
Anglo-American jurisprudential view that the common law 
j udge is an oracle on high, muffled in the black robe of anonym­
ity, uttering the law and deciding the fac ts without 
involvement. 1 9 1 
Communication is instrumental to judge Weinstein 's  commitment to 
access for those who are aggrieved.  He reaches out to hear from, and 
thus better understand the interests and concerns of, those who may be 
affected by j udicial action. In so reaching out, Judge Weinstein serves 
1 84 .  Burbank, supra note 86, at 1 473. 
1 85 .  Weinstein ,  Procedural Reform, supra note 1 56, at 829. 
1 86. See id. 
1 87. Broadening access-for both plaintiffs and defendants-is in  my view a powe1ful 
argument in favor of the curren t  proposal to amend the federal class action rule to permit 
interlocutory appeals from certification decisions in  the discretion of the court of appeals. 
See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1 67 F.R.D.  559, 560, 
565-66 ( 1 996) . 
1 88. Weinstein,  Barriers to Justice,  supra note 1 ,  at 1 906. 
1 89. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 1 09 Stat. 737 ( codified as amended in  scattered sections of 
1 5  U.S.C. and 1 8  U.S.C. ) .  
1 90 .  Cf. Thomas E. Willging e t  al . ,  An Empirical Analysis of Rule 2 3  to Address the 
Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U .  L. Rev. 74, 1 77-79 ( 1 996) (noting differences between 
anecdotal evidence, relied on by Congress, and evidence from empirical study) . 
1 9 1 .  Weinstein ,  Mass Tort Litigation,  supra note 4, at 9. 
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both the dignity and participation values of litigation 1 92 and, ultimately, 
the legitimacy of legal institutions . 1 93 
The rules of procedure provide a structured process for communica­
tions among the parties and the court. They also recognize the impor­
tance in some situations of participation by those who are not formally 
before the court, 1 94 and in class actions, give the judge affirmative re­
sponsibility to provide them with an opportuni ty to be heard. 1 95 With the 
advent of structural reform litigation has come a rich literature on both 
the need for the judge to transcend the traditional umpireal role and the 
difficulty of devising standards to guide the j udge when fashioning, or 
considering a proposed, decree. 1 96 
Structural reform litigation and class actions are the exception, even 
if they garner a disproportionate amount of scholarly (and j udicial ) atten­
tion.  But there is also a rich empirical li terature on the experience of 
those who have been involved in dispute resolution processes, which indi­
cates that for many people, satisfaction lies less in winning than in being 
fairly heard. 1 97 Thus, in reaching out to those ;vho may be affected by 
the decisions he makes, in ordinary and extraordinary cases alike, Judge 
Weinstein has again been ahead of many of his colleagues, and for that 
matter of much of the profession . 
Hmvever, just as communication is essential to Judge Weinstein ' s  
conception of  access, so is it subject to the test of  evenhandedness . Civil 
defendants have needs and concerns too, and they may have employees 
and stockholders to worry about. 1 9s We should not assume that agency 
problems involving communication between lawyer and client are always 
192 .  See Frank Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The 
Right to Protect One's  Rights (pt .  l ,  1 973  Duke LJ 1 1 53, 1 1 72-75 . 
1 9 3 .  See Weinste i n ,  Mass Tort Li tigation,  supra note 4, at 1 3-1 4 ( " I n  this t ime of 
increasing public al ienation from lawyers and the law, the legi ti macy of our legal 
in stitutions depends upon the i ndividual ' s  belief that h e  or she coun l'i in  the system and 
that we lawyers and judges are here to serve all the people . " ) ; see also id. at 56 ( argui n g  
t h a t  public con fidence in o u r  j udicial system depends on o u r  system's  responsiveness to 
people " s  n eeds ) . 
1 94 .  See Feel. R. Civ. P. 1 9, 24.  
1 95 .  Sec Feel .  R.  Civ.  P. 23 .  
1 96. See,  e .g. ,  Abram Chayes, The Role of the J udge in Public Law Litigatio n ,  89 
Harv. L. Rev. 1 28 1 , 1 288-1 304 ( 1 976) ; Susan P .  Sturm ,  A Normative Them;• of Publi c  Law 
Remedies , '79 Ceo. L.J .  1 355, 1 409-46 ( 1 99 1 ) .  
1 97 .  See, e .g . ,  Roben J .  Maccoun e t  al . ,  Alternative Adj udication:  An Evaluation of 
the 0/ew Jersey Automobile Arbitration Program 62 ( 1 988 ) .  
1 98 . .Judge v\'einstein is aware of "the danger that a defendant without substan tial 
fault m ay be driven into h uge settlements or  even put out of business by the quanti ty of 
attackers, if  not  their quality ."  Weinstein ,  Mass Tort Litigation,  supra n o te 4, at 85. It  is  
striking, however, that this acknowledgment  came in a discussion of the Agent Orange 
l i tigation , his approach in which he described as "essential ,  creatin g  i n  effect a new rule of 
substan tive law."  !d.  at 86; see also Mullenix,  supra note 4 ,  at 585 ( " Missing from J udge 
Weinste i n ' s  notion of communitv is the defendant commun i ty .  for exampl e. " ) . 
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greater for plaintiffs than defendants. 199 I t  thus may b e  a m istake for a 
"communicatarian"200 to rely on defense lawyers to bring before the 
court all relevant perspectives in support of their legal contentions. 
Moreover, when a judge reaches out to litigants in nontraditional 
ways, he risks misperception that can sabotage the admirable  goal of us­
ing communication to foster the public 's  views about the legitimacy of 
the system. Those whose interests are opposed to the individuals or 
groups to whom the j udge reaches out may equate communication with 
influence and come to believe that they have not been fairly  treated. 
Judge Weinstein created such problems a few years ago when he met 
on four occasions, on the record, with persons who claime d  to have been 
inj ured by DES and their lawyers, a meeting at which,  in the Judge's 
words, " [ t] he women recounted tragic stories of how DES had affected 
their lives."201 In denying a motion to disqualify himself in the case of 
one of the women with whom he h ad met, Judge Weinstein explained 
that at the time he had been serving "in [a ]  settlement role , "202 and that 
it was then unknown that she would become a plaintiff in a case before 
him. Vigorously defending the "need for the court to communicate with 
the parties,"203 the Judge distinguished empathy and lack of impartial­
ity,204 pointing out that in the meetings he had "noted the importance of 
giving due process to both plaintiff and defendant drug companies" and 
that " [ i ]  n the course of these settlement discussions, the court became 
ful ly aware of the contentions of all parties ."2°5 
Even if Judge Weinstein was technically correct in refusing to dis­
qualify himself in this case ,  a reader of his opinion may not  attribute the 
defense motion to purely strategic behavior, as in so many such situa­
tions. For most litigants, expressions of sympathy and compassion for an 
adversary, given by the judge in a private meeting, suggest a disposition in 
that person's  favor. Neither the existence of a record nor abstract bilat­
eral references to due process and the parties' "contentions" are likely to 
dispel that impression .2°6 
In denying the disqualification motion, Judge Weinstein relied on 
the fact that when he held the meetings in question, he was cooperating 
with a New York judge in an effort to settle New York state court DES 
1 99 .  Cf. Weinstein,  Mass Tort Litigation,  supra note 4, at 1 60-62 ( arguing that agency 
problems between lawyers and their clients in class action context may be no worse than i n  
non-class action context) . 
200. Id. at 46. For criticism of the word and its philosophical underpin nings, see 
Mullenix, supra note 4, at 585-86. 
20 1 .  Bilello v. Abbott Lab. ,  825 F.  Supp. 475, 476 (E .D.N.Y. 1 993) . 
202. Id. at 476. 
203. ld. at  48n. 
204. See id. at 481 .  
205. Id. a t  477 ( "The detailed contentions o f  defendants as to the instant cases were 
presented forcefully." ) . 
206. Characteristically, Judge Weinstein recognizes the problem. See Weinstein,  Mass 
Tort Litigation,  supra note 4, at 99. 
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cases. He j ustified the denial on the ground that quite different norms of 
judicial behavior are appropriate in the settlement role .207 
The problems that active j udicial involvement in settlement can pose 
for the parties and the judge in ordinary litigation include role confu­
sion . 208 The party that moved to disqualify Judge Weinstein may be for­
given for confusion about the role of an Article III  j udge in seeking to 
assist in the settlement of state court cases. Indeed, Judge Weinstein him­
self seems confused about that role, since his subsequent, extrajudicial, 
descriptions of the meetings that led to the disqualification motion sug­
gest that they occurred after the participants ' cases settled.209 
Finally, attention to nontraditional forms of judicial communication 
should not obscure the fact  that the traditional form of communication 
for a litigant who is aggrieved by an action of the trial court is an 
appeaJ . 2 1 o  
3. Empathy. -
The problem of empathy versus impartiality is not an easy one to 
resolve . Even in a medical model, empathy may be dangerous 
since subjectivity may interfere with dispassionate analysis and 
good j udgment. The problems may be more difficult in the 
legal setting. Nevertheless, we must consider parting from a 
traditional modeJ .2 1 1  
As a professor, Jack \Veinstein expressed the view that " [ t] h e  best 
judges depend far more on experience, ability, warmth of spirit, and com­
passion than they do on procedure ."2 1 2 As a judge, he has consistently 
maintained that " [w] ithout the ameliorating effect of a sensitivity to the 
needs of others, the law functions as a rapacious machine whose imparti­
ality will ultimately consume us all .":n 3  Whether in handling social secur­
ity disabil ity appeals or in handling Agent Orange, Judge 'Weinstein has 
207. See Bilello, 825 F. Supp. at 479-8 1 .  
208. See, e.g. ,  Resnik, supra note 74, a t  425-28. 
209. In DES cases, with the assistance of a special master, hundreds of cases were 
settled. Ajter the settlements, one judge sat down with many of the DES claimants 
and heard their harrowing stories. The ability to address the court, with a 
reporter present, seemed to provide a catharsis for those who believed themselves 
harmed by DES. Many of them complained that they could not get health 
insurance for themselves or  their children;  a class action would have provided for 
this contingency and other needs of the group. 
Weinstein, Mass Tort Litigation ,  supra note 4,  at 1 3  (emphasis added) ; see also id. at 99. 
2 1 0. A process perspective on the motivation to appeal suggests that limiting access to 
appellate courts has worrisome implications for judicial legitimacy. See generally Scott 
Barclay, Posner's Economic Model and the Decision to Appeal, 19 Just. Sys. J. 77 ( 1 997) . 
2 1 1 .  Weinstein,  Mass Tort Litigation,  supra note 4, at 99. 
2 1 2. Weinstein ,  Trends, supra note 70, at 1 445. 
2 1 3 . Weinstein,  Justice and Mercy, supra note 141, at 820. Compare Judge 
Weinstein's view about social scientists: "The social scientist unrestrained by sympathy for 
human beings is a menace." Jack B. Wei nstein,  Hans Zeisel's Contributions to the 
Administration ofj ustice and the Sociology of Law, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 2 1 3, 222 ( 1 974) . 
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fol lowed Jerome Frank's  refusal to accept ir-Uustice.2 1 4 H e  has not yet, 
however, provided the answer Frank was looking for when he asked "why 
our j udges must continue to do merciful  justice by stealth . "2 1 0 
Judge Weinstein ' s  commitments to access and communication en­
able him to maximize opportunities for empathy with those who are ag­
grieved, and the benefits and costs of his empathy are l inked to, or re­
flect, the benefits and costs of those other two commitments .  Expressions 
of empathy by a judge humanize what can be a bewildering and dehu­
manizing process and may help even those who are not successful in the 
legal process to feel  that they have been fairly treated.2 1 6  M oreover, the 
capacity to experience and express empathy may wel l  be important to a 
judge 's  performance, by enhancing not only that individual ' s  personal 
satisfaction but also his or her creative contributions to the l aw. 
There can be l i ttle doubt that Judge Weinstein ' s  empathy for those 
who are aggrieved, whose access to the j udicial process he has facilitated 
by enabling aggregation, and to whom he has reached out in communica­
tion,  has caused him at times to depart from the law as i t  is generally 
understood. Thus, Judge Weinstein was "struck by the deep emotional 
underpinnings of the [Agent Orange] l i tigation . '' 2 1 7  Al th ough he recog­
nized that the ''science did not support a viable cause of action , "  he could 
not for that reason "ignor[e]  those cries from the heart for j ustice . "2 1 R 
Indeed, his empathy for various communities of plaintiffs involved in 
mass tort l i tigation-from asbestos, to Agent Orange , to DES, to the 
Dalkon Shield-sometimes causes him to regard them al l  as " tort vic­
tims,"  even though some of them, as he admits ,  cannot recover under the 
existing substantive law. 2 ' 9  
From this perspective, empathy i s  critical to judge Weinstein ' s  depar­
tures from the law as i t  is generally understood, informing the "felt sense 
of appropriateness" to which he has referred .22 1 l  I t  helps to explain,  
although i t  renders no less  subj ective , a principle or standard that "turns 
on the individual judge ' s  . . .  sympathies or ' sense ofjustice . ' " 22 1  More­
over, it may suggest that the dichotomy between independence and ideol­
ogy in the work of Jack Weinstein is false,  because independence of a type 
is in fact the Judge ' s  overriding ideology. 
2 1 4. See Fran k ,  supra note 4,  at 389 ( ".'viercy, ch arity, compassionateness, respect fo r 
the unique attributes of the men and women who come before our trial courts . . .  would 
seem to be needed components of a c ivilized judicial process . " ) . 
2 1 5 .  Id. 
2 1 6. Cf. ·weinstein, Mass Tort Litigation,  sup ra note 4,  at 1 3 , 99.  
2 1 7. Id. at 1 1 .  
2 1 8. I d.  at 1 1 ,  95;  see also id. at 85-86 ( discussing J udge "Weinste in 's  efforts i n  forging 
Agen t Orange settlement, despite poor proof of causation ,  hetween i ndeterminate classes of 
plain tiffs and defendan L';) . 
2 19 .  See id.  at 1 48.  
220. Id.  at 1 7 1 ;  see also supra n ote 77 .  
22 1 .  Weinstein , Jury Nullificati o n ,  supra note 7 1 .  at 246; see also supra text 
accompanying note 77.  
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Ronald Dworkin has suggested that "the conventional, instrumental 
defense of academic freedom" is insufficient, arguing that invasions of 
academic freedom offend an "ideal of ethical individualism" that is val­
ued not just  by academics but also by society. 222 This ideal imposes on 
professors "an undiluted responsibil i ty to the truth, and i t  is ,  in that way, 
the closest a professional responsibility can come to the fundamental eth­
ical responsibility each of us has, according to the ideals of ethical indi­
vidualism, to live our lives m accordance with our own felt 
convictions. "223 
Judge Weinstein has spent a great deal of time in recent years grap­
pling with the ethical issues of those involved in mass tort l i tigation,  in­
cludingjudges.224 Lacking clear and generally accepted ethical s tandards 
to use in considering departures from the law,225 and relying on his sense 
of responsibility " to the people and [his] conscience through the 
Consti tution, "226 Judge Weinstein lives Dworkin ' s  ethical individualism as 
a judge, having l ived it as a professor. 
CoNCLUSION 
It has been a privilege to engage the work, j udicial and extraj udicial , 
of a person as bright, creative and committed to the highest ideals of our 
profession as Jack Weinstein, and equally a privilege to seek to under­
stand and explain the influences that contribute to the judicial behavior 
of such a complex person . I am sure that I have done neither those influ­
ences nor Judge Weinstein j ustice .  
For me both the bad news and the good are that Jack Weinstein is  
unique. The news is bad, because judges with any of his  distinguishing 
qualities-his intellectual power, capacity for pragmatic innovation,  and, 
yes , capacity for empathy-are rare. As our elected representatives leave 
(or commit) more of society's pressing problems to the courts , we shall 
222. Ronald Dworkin ,  We Need a New I n terpretation of Academic Freedom, in The 
Future of Academic Freedom, supra note 1 9 , at 1 8 1 ,  1 87.  
223. Id. at  1 89. 
224. See, e.g. ,  Weinstein,  Mass Tort Litigation,  supra note 4.  
The challenge of ethics in  mass tort cases can be met in either of two ways: 
we can fashion a new set of positive rules to apply in these cases, or we can 
institutionalize a practice of granting "variances ,"  allowing workable relief from 
the ordinary operation of the positive law. In either case, we first must fin d  a set 
of ethical principles to guide our selection of the rules or exceptions we will apply 
in practice. 
Id. at 46 (footnote omitted ) ;  see also id. at 1 7 1  ("Ethical and legal norms out of touch wi th 
real life lead not  to morality, but to hypocrisy, abuse, and waste. " ) . 
225. See supra text accompanying notes 7 1 -80. 
226. See Weinstein,  Nazis, supra note 57, at 1 1 54; supra text accompanying notes 78, 
1 1 5. Judge Wei nstein believes that "the highest traditions of humani ty and personal 
responsibility . . .  ought to characterize our office."  Weinstein ,  Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, supra note 1 43 ,  at 366. 
2008 COLUMBIA L'i W REVIEW [Vol .  97:1971 
need, and shall surely have difficulty finding, more j udges with those 
qualities. 
The news is good, but only in a perverse sense. We are hypocrites, 
refusing to give the courts the tools they reasonably need to solve the 
problems left (or committed)  to their care, but insisting on the ideal-or 
is it  the ideology-of the rule of law.227 But insist we m ust in order to 
preserve a system that, although grossly imperfect, sti l l  seems preferable 
to the alternatives. 
The American Bar Association established a Commission on Separa­
tion of Powers and Judicial Independence,  the immediate animating 
force behind which seems to have been attacks on the j udiciary by mem­
bers of the political branches.228 While the ABA Commission was deliber­
ating, reports from Washington suggested that 'judicial activism" was 
high on the agenda of members of both houses of Congress, some of 
whom apparently believe that impeachment is, after all, a suitable vehicle 
for the expression of profound disagreement with the substance  of judi­
cial decisions. 229 
One might respond to these critics of the federal j udiciary that the 
real problem is " legislative activism," in the sense of kneejerk political 
responses to serious social problems, many of which are then left in the 
lap of the courts.230 Or one might argue that the problem arises from 
"legislative paralysis,"-Congress ' s  refusal both to do legislative work that 
needs to be done231 and to give the judiciary the means to do theirs.232 
Neither is an adequate response. 
They are not adequate at the practical level because m embers of the 
political branches have different utility functions than do federal j udges, 
and the rules of the game they play,233 including their norms of account­
ability, do not put a high premium on rationality. When push comes to 
shove, they also hold most of the power, which is ultimate ly why the j udi­
ciary is the "least dangerous" branch,234 and also the m ost vulnerable .  
That i s  why I believe that if  j udicial disobedience and refusal to  accept 
institutional accountability were more prevalent, Judge Weinstein 's most 
227. See The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology (Allan C. Hutch inson & Patrick 
Monahan eds., 1 987) . 
228. See John Gibeault, Taking Aim, A.B.A. J . ,  Nov. 1 996, at 50, 5 1 .  The Commission 
recently issued its report. See ABA Comm'n on Separation of Powers and Judicial 
Independence, An Independent Judiciary ( 1997) [hereinafter ABA Comm'n ,  An 
Independent Judiciary] . 
229. See, e.g. , Bruce D. Brown, An Empty 1 2th Seat, Legal Times, Mar. 1 7, 1 997, at 6; 
Bruce D. Brown, Right Refocuses Aim at Judiciary, Legal Times, Jan. 20, 1 997,  at 1 ;  see also 
supra text accompanying note 4 1 .  
230. See Geyh, supra note 32, at 1 227; William H .  Rehnquist, 1 995 Year-End Report 
on the Federal Judiciary, 1 9  Am. ]. Trial Advoc.  49 1 , 495-96 ( 1 996) . 
2 3 1 .  See Weinstein ,  Mass Tort Litigation,  supra note 4 ,  at 1 04. 
232. See Rehnquist, supra note 230, at 492-94. 
233. See Posner, supra note 4, at 1 34. 
234. The Federalist No. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton)  (Cl inton Rossiter ed. , 1 961 ) ;  
see also Alexander M .  Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch ( 1 962) . 
1 997] INDEPE.iVDENCE, ll\1AGINATION AND IDEOLOGY 2009 
cherished professional possession-his independence-would be at risk, 
and with it, the independence of the federal j udiciary. 
They are not adequate at the normative level because fidelity to the 
rule of law in a democracy requires that, in the end, the judiciary abide 
irrationality and irresponsibility in the political branches, unless it is  m an­
ifested in behavior that the Constitution, fairly interpreted, repre­
hends.235 "Abide" does not mean accept without question,  or for that 
matter, without insistence that legislative foolishness be clear for all to 
see . The need for more such questions-and answers-for a genuine di­
alogue among the three branches of the federal government, is 
urgent. 2?.6 
Until that time, as always, the capacity of the judiciary to protect us 
from ourselves depends upon its institutional independence.  And the 
maintenance of that precious gift from our forefathers requires that, in 
Franklin ' s  words, federal judges "hang together."237 Judges can be schol­
ars,238 and judge Weinstein remains one of our most interesting and pro­
vocative scholars on issues confronting the courts. But, as judges, they 
must surrender some of the intellectual autonomy of professors. That is 
one of the prices of donning a robe. 
235. See Fallon, supra note 45, at 53-54. 
236. See Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a 
Moratorium, 59 Brook. L. Rev. 841 ,  842-43 ( 1993 ) ;  Stephen B. Burbank, I mplementing 
Procedural Change: Who, How, Why, and When?, 49 Ala. L. Rev. ( forthcoming 1 997) . 
The ABA Commission on Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence has 
recommended that Congress consider establishing "a permanent National Commission on 
the Federal Courts," a primary purpose of which would be to "faci l itate non­
confrontational communication among the branches." See ABA Comm'n ,  An 
Independent J udiciary, supra note 228, at 54. 
237. "We must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang separately." Benjamin 
Frankl in ,  Remarks at the signing of the Declaration of Independence Uuly 4, 1 776) ,  in 
John Bartlett, Familiar Quotations 348 ( 14th ed. 1 968) .  
238. But see supra note 1 1 3 (quoting Weinstein,  Social Security Disability Cases, supra 
note 65, at 897) ( 'judges cannot be scholars." ) .  
